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ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES: OBTAINING TRADITIONAL
FAMILY BENEFITS THROUGH LITIGATION,
LEGISLATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Barbara J. Cox*
Historically, the traditional family, consisting of individuals related
by blood, marriage or adoption, has been the largest segment of the Amer-
ican population.' Over time, it has obtained far-reaching legal protections
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1. Testimony of History and Demography Professor Steven Ruggles, Report of the
Equal Opportunities Commission Alternative Family Rights Task Force, April 11, 1985,
section F, pg. 1. [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report.] The Madison Equal Opportuni-
ties Commission established the task force to study the desirability and feasibility of enact-
ing local legislation which would grant traditional family benefits to alternative families in
the areas of employment-related benefits, single-family housing, family memberships in
organizations, authorization of emergency medical treatment and hospital visitation. The
Madison ordinance, currently being drafted by the City Attorney for introduction to the
Madison Common Council, would require all employers, organizations and medical facili-
ties within the city's boundaries to extend these traditional family benefits to alternative
families. Alternative families would be required to register with the City Clerk before
becoming eligible for benefits. This author was co-chair of the task force during its two
and one-half year existence and has been a Commissioner on the Equal Opportunities
Commission throughout its discussion of an alternative family rights ordinance.
Several other cities have passed or are also studying some type of domestic partners'
legislation which would grant employment benefits to domestic partners of city employees.
Cities that have passed ordinances include Berkeley and West Hollywood, California. Cit-
ies currently studying these ordinances include Santa Cruz and Oakland, California. A
Minneapolis, Minnesota ordinance, being studied, would extend benefits to alternative
families on a city-wide basis, similar to the Madison ordinance. East Lansing, Michigan is
considering a zoning ordinance that would expand its "family" definition to include alter-
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and societal benefits.2 The United States Supreme Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protects personal choice in
matters of family and marriage and establishes the family as a private
realm into which the State cannot enter.'
Today, traditional families most frequently are nuclear families con-
sisting of the husband, the wife, and their dependent children. By virtue of
their protected legal status, these nuclear families enjoy benefits which
have come to be viewed as entitlements or rights. These benefits are ex-
tended to nuclear families alone.4 They include the opportunity to live in
neighborhoods zoned for single-families; receive employment-based health
insurance, bereavement and sick leave, pensions, moving expenses, library
and recreational privileges, and low cost day care and travel packages; sue
for loss of consortium, workers compensation or unemployment compensa-
tion;5 visit family members in hospitals and authorize their emergency
native families.
2. While holding that unrelated individuals could not be legally excluded from a sin-
gle-family neighborhood, the Michigan Supreme Court noted:
That government can classify, draw lines around, and support the biological
family is well settled, as evidenced by our tax and inheritance laws. Our decision
here is not in derogation of the cultural, economic, and moral value of the tradi-
tional family and its essential and unique role in our society, but rather is based
on the fact that the exclusion of groups such as defendants from a residential
neighborhood is not in any way supportive of 'family values.'
Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 277, 351 N.W.2d 831, 843 (1984).
3. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1976).
4. Some of these benefits are granted to extended families, such as the right to live
together in single-family neighborhoods. See infra, fns. 58 to 67 and acompanying text.
But most of them are restricted to nuclear families or give nuclear family members prefer-
ence over extended family members. In fact, one extended family member testified before
the task force requesting inclusion of extended families in the alternative family rights
ordinance. He lived with his father, his children, his sister, and his sister's children as a
family. They had applied for family memberships in various organizations and were de-
nied memberships because they were not a nuclear family. Task Force Report, supra fn.
1, section J, pg. 18-19.
The task force excluded traditional extended families from its definition of alternative
families by including the phrase "not related by blood, marriage or adoption." See, infra,
fn. 8. This resulted primarily from the negative response by insurance companies against
including traditional extended families. The insurance companies were concerned that ad-
verse selection would increase if extended family members could choose to insure their
elderly parents or relatives through employer-based group health insurance. See, infra,
fns. 117 to 128 and accompanying text. During its deliberation, the Madison Equal Op-
portunities Commission decided that traditional extended families encounter the same type
of discrimination as did other alternative families. It voted to eliminate the phrase "not
related by blood, mrriage or adoption" from the task force's definition of an alternative
family. However, because the Commission restricted alternative family size to "two adults
... plus dependents," many traditional extended families are still excluded from coverage
under the proposed Madison ordinance.
5. Generally, this article discusses benefits that can be obtained through litigation,
local legislation and collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, this article does not dis-
cuss extending some traditional family benefits to alternative families, such as favorable
tax and inheritance status, state or federally controlled entitlements programs (such as
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medical treatment; and receive low cost family rates from organizations
such as health clubs, museums and art centers.
Due to the legal protections and benefits given to the traditional nu-
clear family, one could expect that most Americans live in nuclear families
and receive these protections and benefits. However, less than thirty per-
cent of all Americans live in nuclear families.6 Instead, more and more
individuals are living together as unmarried heterosexual couples, gay or
lesbian couples, or as other family groups such as communes or several
person households."
These individuals are forming alternative families.8 They are not
welfare, Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Social Security) and intra-family
privileges in law suits. This discussion is excluded because of space considerations; the
author does not intend to imply, through its exclusion, that these benefits should remain
restricted to only traditional families. Also, it does not discuss rights between alternative
family members in property settlements and support actions at the termination of the fam-
ily relationship. For a discussion of these issues as related to cohabitating heterosexual
couples, See, Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage A Different Perspective, 28
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1125 (1981). This article does not extensively discuss the question of
state or federal preemption of municipalities' power to extend certain benefits to alterna-
tive family members. [See, infra, fns. 222 to 224 and accompanying text.]
The benefit of suing for loss of consortium is included because it is a common law
right susceptible to expansion through litigation [See, infra, fns. 161 to 193 and accompa-
nying text.] Similarly, brief references to unemployment and workers compensation are
made because these benefits, depending on the particular statutory language, could be ex-
tended through litigation. [See, infra, fns. 195 to 205 and accompanying text.]
6. Ruggles, supra fn. 1, at p.1. Ruggles defines a nuclear family as a married couple
and their dependent children. According to Lenore Weitzman, approximately 32% of all
American households are nuclear families and another 30% consist of a married couple
without children or whose children have left home. Weitzman, Changing Families,
Changing Laws: Ten Major Trends That Have Altered the Lifestyles of Parents and
Children 5 Fain. Advocate 2, 3 (1982).
7. Cohabitation between heterosexual couples has increased by 800 percent betwen
1960 and 1970. During the same time period, the number of legally married couples in-
creased by only 10 percent. In 1980, Census Bureau statistics estimated that 1.8 million
Americans lived as cohabitating couples, a 300 percent increase since 1970. Demographers
estimate that by 1990 only slightly more than 25% of all households will consist of tradi-
tional families, married couples with children. Comment, Loss of Consortium: Adaption of
a Common Law Cause of Action to a Modern Day Reality, 54 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 512,
513 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Loss of Consortium].
Ruggles estimates that 1 in 25 Americans or 10,000,000 people could benefit from the
extension of traditional family benefits to alternative families. Included in these figures are
the 3.3 million households of groups of unrelated individuals who contain 7.7 million per-
sons. Ruggles, supra fn. 1, at p. 2. These changes in the composition of households and
families led the Wisconsin Center for Demography and Ecology to recommend that for the
1990 census, a question should be included so that individuals could identify a partner or a
lover, rather than simply indicating whether they are "single" or "married." This recom-
mendation resulted from the conclusion that social reality changes more rapidly than the
statistical system. Testimony of Urban Planner Steve Bubul, Task Force Report, supra fn.
1, at section J, p. 36-38.
8. One definition of an alternative family comes from the Task Force Report, supra
note 1, at p. 1 of the introduction. Under that definition, an alternative family is:
Two or more adults, not related by blood, marriage or adoption, who are in-
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challenging the family as a valid life choice; they are challenging the cur-
rent conception of what a family's composition must be. They point out
that the word "family" did not originally include a restriction to nuclear
families or even extended families related by blood, marriage or adoption.
[T]he ordinary concept of (family) does not necessarily imply only a
group bound by ties of relationship. 'Family' is derived from the Latin
'familia.' Originally the word meant servant or slave, but now its ac-
cepted definition is a collective body of persons living together in one
house, under the same management and head subsisting in common, and
directing their attention to a common object, the promotion of their mu-
tual interests and social happiness .... This court has said that the term,
"family," did not necessarily exclude from its meaning a group of unre-
lated persons living together in a home."
Members of alternative families maintain that their families provide
the same opportunities for companionship, care, love, intimacy and self-
identification as do traditional nuclear families. They argue that because
their alternative families fill the same function and provide the same ad-
vantages as traditional families, both to the individuals involved and to
society, their families should receive the same legal protections and bene-
fits that traditional families receive. These alternative families have begun
challenging the restriction of protections and benefits to traditional fami-
lies and have begun pushing for legal recognition of their families in the
courts, through local legislation, and under collective bargaining
agreements.
volved in a mutually supportive, committed relationship and who are voluntarily
registered publicly ... together with their dependent children.
Other ordinances currently in existence or being studied usually refer to domestic partners,
not alternative families, and usually define domestic partners as lesbian or gay couples.
With the exception of the Madison ordinance, all these ordinances have only extended to
considered extending benefits to lesbian and gay couples, usually with the explanation that
these couples, unlike unmarried heterosexual couples, cannot gain legal recognition for
their relationship because all fifty states prohibit them from marrying. Rivera, Queer Law:
Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties Part II, 11 U. Dayton L. Rev. 275, 373
(1986). [hereinafter Rivera]. For a discussion of the issue of gay and lesbian marriage, see,
Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to Marry - Why Can't
Fred Marry George - or Mary and Alice at the Same Time? 10 J. Contemp. Law 33
(1984). See also, infra fn. 19.
For purposes of this article, the broad Madison task force definition will be used
when referring to alternative families, except the task force's exclusion of families related
by blood, marriage or adoption is eliminated. See, supra, fn. 4 and the discussion con-
tained therein. Before sending its proposal to the City Attorney's Office for drafting, the
Madison Equal Opportunities Commission altered the definition of an alternative family
to include only "two adults . . . plus dependents" thus making its alternative family
equivalent to the traditional nuclear family. Because this was done for political reasons
and not because extended alternative families do not exist, this article will use the original
task force definition when referring to alternative families. Thus, alternative families will
include unmarried heterosexual couples, lesbian and gay couples, and other groups of
adults and children who consider themselves to be a family.
9. Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 436, 288 N.W.2d 815, 823 (1980).
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This article will first discuss the constitutional and equitable basis
for extending rights to alternative families. Next, it will discuss each ma-
jor protection and benefit granted to traditional families and then examine
the litigation, legislation, and collective bargaining agreements obtaining
or attempting to obtain the same benefit for alternative families. This arti-
cle will end by arguing that equity and justice require an extension of
these benefits to alternative families.
I. The Constitutional and Equitable Basis for Extending Protections
and Benefits to Alternative Families
Alternative families want the same legal protections and benefits that
traditional families receive. In advocating for the extension of these pro-
tections and benefits to their families, they point to a constitutionally-pro-
tected freedom of intimate association. That such a freedom exists beyond
the bounds of the traditional family is denied by some commentators. But
regardless of whether a constitutional basis exists for an extension of pro-
tections and benefits to alternative families, equity demands that alterna-
tive families receive equal treatment under the law. And alternative fami-
lies are making, and winning, their demand for such equal treatment.
While granting constitutional protection to the privacy rights of mar-
ried couples, Justice Douglas eloquently described the marital relationship
in Griswold v. Connecticut:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes, a harmony in living, not political
faiths, a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.1
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly enunciated a constitu-
tionally-protected freedom to form intimate associations, Kenneth Karst
argues that the Court's decisions on marriage, procreation, legitimacy, and
parent-child relations have resulted in the overall protection of such a
freedom.11 He claims that the freedom to form intimate associations is
behind the Court's decisions granting legal protections to traditional fami-
lies. And this same freedom forms the basis for alternative families' consti-
tutional claim for extending legal protections to their families.
Intimate association is a close and familiar personal relationship with
another that in a significant way is comparable to marriage or a family
relationship. The values that intimate association promote are the oppor-
10. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
11. Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 626 (1979-1980)
[hereinafter cited as Karst]. Karst developed his outline of the freedom of intimate associa-
tion in this article. But other authors, most notably Laurence Tribe, had earlier outlined
this type of constitutional protection although without the same name. See, Tribe, Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 985-90 (1978).
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tunity to enjoy the companionship of certain other people 2; the opportu-
nity to satisfy the need to love and be loved, to care and be cared for"3; the
opportunity for intimacy with another person which includes sharing per-
sonal information and sharing present and future important experiences14 ;
and the opportunity for self-identification by telling oneself and society
about oneself through one's choice of partners and the forming of an inti-
mate association. 5 These values are inherent in most alternative family
relationships in the same way they are inherent in most traditional family
relationships.
The freedom to form intimate associations is not absolute and it must
give way to overriding state interests. 16 But typically individuals are free
to form intimate associations and have their associations protected from
state interference. The Supreme Court has specifically protected intimate
associations between married couples'" and between unmarried heterosex-
ual couples.' 8 Although the state does not affirmatively force an individual
to choose a particular type of intimate association, 9 the state does grant
preference to some forms of intimate association by conditioning the re-
ceipt of certain material benefits on an individual's associational status.20
Alternative family members are beginning to challenge the grant of
legal protections and material benefits on the basis of a preferred associa-
tional choice. They are not willing to be restricted to the traditional nu-
clear family model when forming intimate associations. And they are not
willing to endure reduced legal protections and fewer material benefits as
the cost of expressing their choice of intimate association.
Some commentators argue, however, that a constitutionally-based
freedom to form intimate associations does not exist beyond the traditional
family relationship, the marital relationship and the parent-child relation-
ship that have been specifically protected in the Supreme Court's deci-
12. Karst, supra fn. 11, at 630.
13. Id. at 632-33. Karst notes that this opportunity also includes the opportunity to
feel the guilt of exploitation, the anxiety of dependency and all the related angers and
agonies of a relationship. Id.
14. Id. at 634-35.
15. Id. at 636.
16. Id. at 627.
17. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
18. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). This decision does show the
court's willingness to specifically recognize the rights of this particular form of alternative
family. But see, Hollenbough v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa.
1977), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1374 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (upheld
Library's decision to fire two heterosexual employees for living openly in a nonmarital
relationship).
19. All fifty states do, however, prohibit same-sex marriage. Rivera, supra fn. 8, at
373. See also, Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971); Note, Develop-
ments - The Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1283-1289 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Devel-
opments] and supra fn. 8
20. Karst, supra fn. 11, at 648.
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sions. 1 They note that the Court's decisions have effectively defined a
"family" as persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption 22 and assert
that attempts to link unconventional lifestyle preferences and associations,
such as alternative families, to the traditional family "liberty" cases are
misplaced.2" The Supreme Court has not shown a willingness to recognize
a constitutional freedom to form intimate associations that extends beyond
marriage, kinship and adoption.24 The Court's recent decision in Bowers
21. See, Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Pri-
vacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 471 (1982-
83) [hereinafter cited as Hafen] and others cited therein.
22. Id. at 491-492. But see, Developments, supra fn. 19, at 1271 which argues that
the Court has shown a willingness to consider a "broad" concept of family which extends
beyond the traditional family to other relationships. It also notes that "the Court has con-
sistently avoided giving a definitive and comprehensive definition of the family." Id.
23. Id. at 524. He notes that such attempts have been made by Kenneth Karst, Lau-
rence Tribe [see supra, fn. 11] and David A.J. Richards. [See, Sexual Autonomy and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Con-
stitution, 30 Hastings L.J. 957 (1979).]
24. Hafen, supra fn. 21, at 504. The fact that the Supreme Court has not yet explic-
itly recognized constitutionally-protected freedom to form intimate associations beyond this
realm does not mean, however, that the Court has indicated that such an extension is
unlikely. If the Court follows its language stated in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104
S.Ct. 3244 (1984) such an extension may be just waiting for the presentation of a sympa-
thetic factual situation to the Court. While discussing the constitutional safeguards to
choose and maintain certain intimate human relationships because of the role of those
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme, the Court stated:
Family relationships, by their very nature, involve deep attachments and commit-
ments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively per-
sonal aspects of one's life. Among other things, they are distinguished by such
attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin
and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship. As a general matter, only relationships with these sort of qualities
are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of free-
dom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty. Id. at 3250-51.
The Court used this discussion of family to contrast that type of relationship with large,
unselective associations like the Jaycees. Id. at 3251. It is important to note that in care-
fully laying out the characteristics of a family, the Court in no way indicted that a hetero-
sexual married couple must form the base of constitutionally-protected family. Alternative
families have all the characteristics that the Court specified as necessary for the formation
of a family that would be protected by the Constitution.
Although the Court decided Jaycees before it decided Bowers v. Hardwick, infra fn.
25, the Bowers decision does not establish that the court will reject constitutional protec-
tion for all alternative families as it did reject constitutional protection for gay men's sex-
ual activity. In Bowers, the Court based its decision on the historical discrimination against
gay men. [This author believes that the Bowers decision was ill-conceived and based on
prejudice, rather than the application of well-reasoned constitutional principles.] Such a
well-established history against alternative families does not exist. Additionally, because
the nature of an alternative family's relationship is more than "mere" sexual activity, it is
possible that the Court would protect, for example, an alternative family formed by lesbi-
ans or gay men and their children, whereas it would not protect gay men's right to consen-
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v. Hardwick2 5 upholding the constitutionality of a Georgia statute outlaw-
ing homosexual sodomy between consenting adults in private, lends
credence to this argument.
Regardless of how one analyzes the Supreme Court's prior decisions
in this area, it cannot be denied that the Supreme Court has not yet recog-
nized a constitutionally-protected freedom to form intimate associations
beyond the traditional relationships noted above."6 Until such recognition
occurs, alternative families will have to continue to press for the extension
of traditional families' protections and benefits through litigation, legisla-
tion, and collective bargaining agreements.2 But throughout this process,
their strongest argument lies in the simple equity and justice inherent in
their claim for equal treatment.
Alternative family members have expanded their own definition of
what constitutes a family and they are challenging society and the legal
system to accept and protect their families. Alternative families possess the
same attributes as traditional families.2" They provide the same benefits to
sual sexual activity. See also, Developments, supra fn. 19, which argues that by identify-
ing some degree of permanence as a necessary condition for familial protection, such a
distinction by the Court may be possible. Therefore, given the Court's long-standing pro-
tection of the family, and despite its decision in Bowers, it is reasonable that the Court, if
presented with a sympathetic factual situation, would grant constitutional protection to
alternative families.
25. 54 U.S.L.W. 4919 (U.S. June 30, 1986).
26. The Supreme Court, however, has shown a willingness to recognize families be-
yond the nuclear or the extended family. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equity and Reform, [OFFER], 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1976), the Court recognized that a
deep, loving, and interdependent relationship can exist in the absence of a blood relation-
ship. The Court stated that the foster family did deserve more recognition for its familial
relationship than did a "mere collection of unrelated individuals." Id. at 844-45. The
Court, however, did distinguish the foster family from the "natural" family because unlike
the "natural" family, the foster family has its source in contractual arrangements set up by
the state. This distinction is inapplicable when comparing alternative families with tradi-
tional families because neither family-type has its origin in contractual relations. Rather,
these families' origins are based on the intimate associational choices of the original
partners.
27. See Parts II, III, and IV, infra.
28. After analyzing the Court's major decisions in the family and marriage definition
cases, it has been suggested that relationships that the Court may constitutionally protect
in the same manner that it protects the traditional family have one or more of the follow-
ing five attributes. Developments, supra, fn. 19, at 1280-83. Those attributes are: 1) bio-
logical relationship, 2) potential parent-child relationship, 3) cohabitation, 4) permanence
and formal commitment, and 5) psychological support and involvement. Id. at 1281. All
alternative families possess some or all of these attributes and therefore are relationships
that would be protected by the Court under this analysis.
1) Biological relationship. Some alternative families include biological parent-child
relationships or other blood relatives, including siblings, cousins, and distant blood rela-
tives. Additionally, Developments supra fn. 19 notes that it is the associational element of
the biological relationship, not the biological connection, that makes this connection funda-
mentally important to individuals. Id.
2) Potential parent-child relationship. Some alternative families provide the potential
for parent-child relationships because they are formed by heterosexual partners who have
[Vol. 2:1
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both individuals and society that traditional families provide because they
the same potential for children as do married couples. Additionally, lesbian and gay
couples often have children in their families as result of children from one or both part-
ner's previous marriage; adoption; or, in the case of lesbian couples, artificial insemination,
and in the case of gay couples, using a surrogate mother. In fact, so many lesbian and gay
couples are deciding whether to have children that books have been written to help guide
the couple through their decision. See, C. Pies, Considering Parenthood: A Workbook for
Lesbians (1986).
3) Cohabitation. Most alternative families share a home, in the same way that most
traditional families share a home. However, the expectation of a one family home where
all family members live has changed with the advent of "commuter" relationships where
one family member commutes between a residence in the city where his or her job is
located and the residence where the rest of the family lives. Not cohabiting in the same
residence has not resulted in a loss of protections and benefits for the traditional family.
And to the extent that traditional families are no longer expected to maintain only one
residence in order to obtain family protections and benefits, so too alternative families
should not have to establish the existence of this attribute before receiving alternative fam-
ily protections and benefits.
4) Permanence and formal commitment. Alternative families can be expected to have
the same level of permanence in their relationships that traditional families have. A fuller
discussion of the reasons behind this assertion is found later in this footnote. Additionally,
requirements such as registering with the City Clerk under the Madison proposed ordi-
nance [see, supra, fn. 1] or signing an affidavit for the Berkeley School District [see, infra,
fn. 141] before becoming eligible for alternative family protections and benefits shows the
same type of formal commitment to the relationship that is manifested by a couple ob-
taining a marriage license.
5) Psychological support and involvement. This attribute, which usually results from
the existence of any or all of the previous four, is what makes long-standing, intimate
family relationships so significant for individuals. Developments, supra fn. 19, at 1283.
Alternative families provide their families with the same psychological support and in-
volvement that is expected, and sometimes found, in traditional families. Society's recogni-
tion of and the legal system's protection of alternative families would correspondingly
strengthen this attribute in alternative families.
In justifying the legal distinction between traditional and nontraditional (alternative)
families, Hafen argues that the one thing that families based on marriage, kinship and
adoption possess, and that alternative families lack, is an expectation in the permanence of
the relationship.
This analysis of the nature of an interest or a relationship is so significant that it
warrants extraordinary constitutional protection is one of the court's most impor-
tant contributions to an understanding of the constitutional test that puts mar-
riage, kinship, and adoption in a different category from other relationships. The
relative permanence of relationships arising from marriage, kinship, or adoption
creates the 'justifiable expectation ... that their relationship will continue indefi-
nitely,' which gives such relationships a unique nature in terms of both human
and legal expectations .... Absent a verifiable basis for presuming permanent
commitments, neither the parties involved nor the state can reasonably assume
enough about the nature of the relationship to warrant the personal investment
or the full-blown legal protection necessary to sustain family relationships.
Hafen, supra fn. 21, at 504, 506. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
However, Hafen does not provide support for his assertion that traditional families
are more permanent in nature than alternative families. He simply asserts that
"[i]mpermanent relationships [such as alternative families] that perform some intimate or
associational 'functions' cannot claim the same position as marriage and kinship in ensur-
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are the same as traditional families in every way except actual composi-
tion. In the same manner as traditional families, alternative families pro-
vide nurturance, stability and continuity for their children and encourage
their family members to work for and invest themselves in the ongoing
existence of their family relationship.29 For exactly the reasons that tradi-
ing a political structure that limits government, stabilizes social patterns, and protects plu-
ralistic liberty through the power of its own relational permanency." Id. at 482. (footnotes
omitted). In his next sentence, Hafen acknowledges that this assertion of heightened
permanance cannot be empirically verified and states that empirical studies cannot "con-
firm or refute the assumptions which must be made, one way or another, in formulating a
legal regime to govern domestic relationships." Id. at 482-83. (emphasis added).
It is just as valid, however, to make a different assumption regarding the relative level
of permanence that would exist between traditional families and alternative families, espe-
cially if alternative families received the extensive protections, benefits and societal support
currently given to traditional families. This is especially true considering the extreme in-
crease in the divorce rate. Hafen acknowledges that between 1960 and 1978, the divorce
rate increased 157 percent. Additionally, according to Lenore Weitzman, the current di-
vorce rate is at least forty-eight percent (48%) and may actually be significantly higher.
Weitzman, supra fn. 6, at 4-5.
Given this fact that almost half of all marriages now end in divorce, even with the
societal support and benefits those marriages receive, it is hard to believe in a "justifiable
expectation ... that [the marital] relationship will continue indefinitely." Hafen, supra fn.
21, at 486, citing Smith, 431 U.S. at 860 (Stewart, J., concurring). In fact, if permanence
is the main distinction between traditional families and alternative families, as Hafen ar-
gues, there is no strong reason for restricting legal protections and benefits to traditional
families. While the number of alternative family relationships which end in termination is
unknown, it cannot be significantly higher than the 48% conservative estimate of marriages
ending in divorce in this society.
Traditional family relationships may be more permanent than uncommitted
nonmarital relationships, but alternative family relationships are also more permanent
than uncommitted nonmarital relationships. This is because alternative families have
formed a family relationship, as opposed to an uncommitted, intimate association. Thus,
the same permanence expected of traditional nuclear family relationships should also be
expected of alternative family relationships. In the same way that obtaining a marriage
license indicates a step beyond an impermanent, uncommitted relationship, so too would
registering as an alternative family indicate a step beyond an impermanent, uncommitted
relationship. In both instances, the family members are showing their intent to form a
lasting, legally protected relationship. Thus, in both instances, society and the legal system
should look upon each relationship with a belief in the relationship's permanence. If both
traditional and alternative families have similar expectations of permanency, then Hafen's
jusitification for treating them differently under the law is eliminated.
29. Hafen, supra fn. 21, at 475, 486. The "proof" or "evidence" behind this state-
ment comes from the author's four year study of alternative families as a member of the
Madison Equal Opportunities Commission and its Alternative Family Rights task force.
See, supra, fn. 1. By listening to the testimony of numerous alternative family members, it
is apparent that these families consider their role and their function as equivalent to that of
the traditional family and that these families do, in fact, possess the same attributes as
traditional families. The "best evidence" for this statement would come from reading the
entire task force report. See, supra, fn. 1. But because most readers will be unable to do
that, it is hoped that the "truth" of this statement will become apparent after the reader
has read the many examples included in this article. See, also, Comment, Homosexuals'
Right to Marry, 128 U.Pa. L. Rev. 193, 197-99 (1979) (references to psychological and
sociological "evidence" showing that established homosexual relationships are virtually
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tional families receive protections and benefits from society - because it
is for the good of both individuals and society to encourage the perma-
nence and stability of these relationships - alternative families also need
society's support and encouragement. Because they provide the same bene-
fits to society, they deserve the same protections and benefits from society.
Simple equity and justice require this equivalent treatment. "Courts can
take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that
laws be equal in operation."' 0 Those laws and the entitlements to benefits
obtained by traditional families should be equally granted to alternative
families.
Very slowly, the public emergence of alternative families is altering
society's traditional definition of what constitutes a family. And very
slowly, alternative families are being recognized by courts, employers, un-
ions, insurance companies, municipalities and organizations as having an
equal claim to the traditional family's legal protections and societal
benefits.
II. Obtaining Traditional Family Housing Benefits for Alternative
Families
Alternative families are using the court system and local legislation to
challenge typical zoning ordinances that restrict single-family neighbor-
hoods to families related by blood, marriage or adoption. They are chal-
lenging zoning ordinances restricting the number of unrelated individuals
who may live together which prevents most alternative families from liv-
ing in single-family neighborhoods.
The United States Supreme Court appears to have closed off the use
of federal constitutional rights as a vehicle for alternative families to use
in challenging these restrictive zoning ordinances. 1 The Court has, how-
ever, clearly ruled that the federal constitution does protect the right of
traditional nuclear and extended families to share a home in single-family
neighborhoods.3 2
identical to established heterosexual relationships) and Developments, supra fn. 19, at
1285-86, nf. 192-193 (presents studies on both sides of the "debate" on whether homosex-
uals can have lasting, psychologically satisfying relationships.
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 citing Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
31. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1984). In Belle Terre, the Supreme Court
rejected the claim asserted by unrelated college students of a constitutional right to live
together in single-family neighborhoods. The Court did not reach the question of whether
alternative families, as defined in this article, have a federal constitutional right to live
together in single-family neighborhoods. Additionally, lower court decisions before the
Belle Terre decision have held that the federal constitution does protect the right of unre-
lated individuals to live together in single-family neighborhoods. Alternative families may
find these lower court decisions useful in claiming that their federal constitutional rights do
protect them and that the Belle Terre decision, on its facts, does not apply to them. See,
infra, fns. 58 to 70 and accompanying text.
32. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
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Although the federal constitution currently does not provide a legal
basis for zoning ordinance challenges, several state courts have held that
their.state constitutions protect the rights of unrelated individuals, and
therefore alternative families, to live together in single-family neighbor-
hoods. Additionally, alternative families are hoping to obtain local legisla-
tion redefining "family" in zoning ordinances to include alternative fami-
lies. Examination of these state cases and the proposed zoning ordinances
establishes that alternative families in some states can exercise the right to
live in single-family neighborhoods.
A. Historical Protection for Traditional Families
In 1926, the Supreme Court established the constitutional parameters
of a municipality's authority to use zoning laws to designate residential,
business and industrial zones within the municipality. 3 The question
before the Court was whether the Village of Euclid (Village), just outside
Cleveland, Ohio, could restrict land use under a comprehensive zoning
plan which regulated the location of businesses, industries, apartment
buildings and single family houses within the Village.14 The plaintiff ar-
gued that the ordinance was an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the
Village's police power and thus, impaired his right to property guaranteed
under the United States and Ohio Consitutions."
In its first major decision upholding municipalities' authority to es-
tablish residential neighborhoods, the Court held that the Village of Eu-
clid's zoning ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the Village's police
power. 6 When examining the ordinance, the Court had no difficulty sus-
taining restrictions on building heights, use of materials and methods of
construction; restrictions regulating overcrowding and fire danger; and re-
strictions excluding offensive businesses from residential neighborhoods."
The ultimate question raised by the case was whether a municipality
could constitutionally create and maintain residential districts from which
all businesses and trades were excluded. 8
In laying out the test for determining whether a zoning ordinance is
constitutionally valid, the Court held that Euclid's zoning ordinance as a
whole constituted a permissive use of the Village's police power because it
was not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."3 9 In reaching
33. Euclid v. Amber Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
34. Id. at 379-380. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the impact of the zoning law
on his vacant property which, if unrestricted and used as business property, was worth
$10,000 per acre and if restricted and used only as residential property, was worth only
$2,500 per acre. Id. at 384.
35. Id. at 373.
36. Id. at 387-388.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 390.
39. Id. at 395. The Court noted that because the plaintiff had not objected to any
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its decision that the Village could constitutionally exclude all businesses
from residential districts, the Court noted that numerous zoning commis-
sions and experts concurred in the view that segregating residential, busi-
ness and industrial buildings provided numerous advantages to a commu-
nity. These advantages included (a) making it easier to provide fire-
fighting apparatus appropriate to the type of building and neighborhood;
(b) increasing the safety and security of home life; (c) preventing street
accidents, especially to children, by reducing traffic in residential neigh-
borhoods; (d) decreasing noise and other conditions which cause or inten-
sify nervous disorders; and (e) preserving a more favorable environment
for rearing children.40 Ensuring these advantages was an acceptable exer-
cise of a municipality's police power as it related to health, safety, morals
and welfare.41
The Euclid decision laid out the test for courts to use in determining
whether restrictions on land use through the application of zoning ordi-
nances were constitutional. The Court held that to be constitutional, a
zoning ordinance must be a reasonable exercise of the police power by
bearing a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general
welfare. Additionally, the Court noted that even if an ordinance as a
whole were constitutional, it would be possible that some provisions, set
forth in "tedious and minute detail," could be arbitrary or unreasonable
as applied to particular premises or under particular circumstances.42 Vio-
lation of this test is what alternative families must establish when raising
a federal constitutional challenge to zoning ordinances.
The next Supreme Court case affecting the constitutional rights of
alternative families was Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.43 In this case,
the Supreme Court applied the Euclid test to an ordinance restricting the
number of unrelated individuals who could live together in a single family
neighborhood. This case involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance in
Belle Terre, New York that restricted all land use within the Village to
single-family dwellings, and excluded all lodging, boarding, fraternity or
multiple-dwelling houses. The ordinance defined "family" as "[o]ne or
more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A
number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together
as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family."'44 The appellees were
specific application of the ordinance to his land but rather challenged the ordinance as a
whole, the Court did not have to decide whether any specific application would have been
arbitrary.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 394.
43. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
44. Id. at 2. This ordinance does recognize the existence of alternative families but
restricts their size to two persons, while leaving the size of traditional families unrestricted.
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homeowners who leased their house to six college students who were un-
related by blood, adoption, or marriage.
The Court held that Belle Terre had validly exercised its police
power in restricting the number of unrelated individuals who could live
together within the Village."' After determining that the ordinance did not
impinge on any fundamental rights, the Court held that the only require-
ment for constitutional validity was meeting the Euclid test: a zoning or-
dinance must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must bear a rational rela-
tionship to a permissible state objective.46 In its much-quoted language,
the Court held that Belle Terre could establish single-family neighbor-
hoods where more than two unrelated individuals were not allowed to
live:
The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like present
urban problems. More people occupy a given space; more cars rather
continuously pass by; more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds.
A quiet space where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs .... The police power is not confined to elimination of
filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.47
The Court's decision has been read by some courts as allowing municipal-
ities to constitutionally exclude unrelated individuals, regardless of the na-
ture of their relationship with one another, from single-family
neighborhoods.48
However, it can also be interpreted as simply excluding unrelated
college students from single-family neighborhoods and not reaching the
question of whether an alternative family can be excluded from the same
neighborhoods.49 The Court's respect for strictly single-family neighbor-
hoods does not conflict with admitting alternative families into these
neighborhoods. Alternative families do not cause the problems associated
with boarding houses, fraternity houses and "the like." In fact, because
alternative families are single families, their housing needs and desires
more closely resemble those of traditional families than those of the college
students excluded from Belle Terre.
Rather than enunciating a constitutional exclusion of alternative fam-
ilies from single-family neighborhoods, the Court's decision simply repeats
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 7-8. In order to be constitutionally valid, a zoning ordinance must be justi-
fiable under the police power of the municipality, asserted for the public welfare. If the
legislative classifications for zoning purposes are fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
controls.
47. Id. at 9.
48. See, New Jersey v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 122, 405 A.2d 368, 379 (1979) (Moun-
tain, J., dissenting) and the cases cited therein.
49. See, Tribe, supra fn. 11, at 989-90 n. 30.
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what the Euclid decision indicated almost forty-five years earlier: it is
constitutionally permissible for zoning ordinances to restrict residential
neighborhoods to legitimate families. However, the Court seemed oblivi-
ous to the fact that legitimate families can also consist of unrelated indi-
viduals who have formed an alternative family. Thus, the Court's decision
may be susceptible to a challenge by an alternative family asserting a fed-
eral constitutional right to live together in a single-family dwelling.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall laid out the approach that an alter-
native family could take in challenging the Belle Terre decision. He as-
serted that the majority erred by sustaining Belle Terre's zoning ordi-
nance with only a showing of a rational relationship to achieving
legitimate state objectives.50 He argued that the ordinance violated the ap-
pellees' fundamental rights of privacy and association and thus the major-
ity should have given the ordinance strict equal protection scrutiny.51
Although zoning officials can concern themselves with land use,
Marshall contended that they cannot consider who the people are who
reside in the dwellings. 52 He asserted that the ordinance unnecessarily
burdened the appellees' freedom of association and freedom of privacy and
therefore was unconstitutional.
The choice of household companions-of whether a person's 'intellectual
and emotional needs' are best met by living with family, friends, profes-
sional associates, or others-involves deeply personal considerations as to
the kind and quality of intimate relationships . . . . The instant ordi-
nance discriminates on the basis of just such a personal lifestyle choice as
to household companions .... The village has, in effect, acted to fence
out those individuals whose choice of lifestyle differs from its current
residents .... [This ordinance] thus reaches beyond control of the use of
land or the density of population, and undertakes to regulate the way
people choose to associate with each other within the privacy of their
own homes.53 (footnotes omitted)
According to Marshall, because the ordinance impinged on the ap-
pellees' fundamental rights, it would withstand their constitutional chal-
50. Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
51. Karst also argues that any governmental intrusion on choosing one's living ar-
rangements demands a substantial governmental justification - in proportion to its likeli-
hood to force individuals out of one form of intimate association and into another. Karst,
supra fn. 1, at 687. He notes that the Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
533-34 (1972), required a substantial state justification, and found it lacking, in Congress'
attempt to deny food stamps to households made up of unrelated individuals. Id. In the
same way, the Belle Terre ordinance directly assaulted the appellees' freedom to form
intimate associations because it attacked living arrangements which did not fit the subur-
ban norm - a norm no longer consistent with a majority of the population. Karst, supra
fn. 1, at 689. As Laurence Tribe notes, the state's power to reinforce one type of relation-
ship does not extend the power to stamp out another type of relationship, although this is
what Belle Terre did by authorizing households composed of related individuals and out-
lawing those composed of unrelated individuals. Tribe, supra fn. 11, at 989.
52. Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 15.
53. Id. at 16-17.
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lenge only if it protected a compelling and substantial governmental inter-
est through the least intrusive means possible.54 While Marshall agreed
that the Village's interests in controlling population density, noise, traffic
and parking problems and ensuring its attractiveness to families were sub-
stantial governmental interest, he concluded that the means chosen to ac-
complish those ends were both overinclusive and underinclusive 5 The
Village's goals could have been achieved just as effectively by an ordinance
that did not discriminate on the basis of constitutionally-protected lifestyle
choices. 6 Thus, by restricting the size of unrelated households while per-
mitting related households of unlimited sizes, Marshall determined that
"the village has embarked upon its commendable course in a constitution-
ally faulty vessel."5
On first reading, the Belle Terre decision seems to crush any hope of
federal constitutional protection for alternative families wanting to live in
single-family neighborhoods. But by restricting the decision to its facts and
by using the approach laid out in Justice Marshall's dissent, alternative
families may be able to raise a successful challenge to restrictive zoning
ordinances. The possible success of such a case will depend, in part, on
the makeup of the alternative family involved and how closely it resembles
the type of families protected in other Supreme Court decisions.
In addition to protecting the traditional nuclear family, the Supreme
Court has also established an explicit constitutional protection for ex-
tended families living in single-family neighborhoods. In Moore v. East
Cleveland,58 the plaintiff challenged an East Cleveland zoning ordinance
which only permitted traditional nuclear families in her neighborhood and
thus prohibited her from living as a family with her son and two grand-
sons (who were cousins). In declaring the ordinance to be unconstitu-
tional, the Court distinguished Belle Terre by noting that Belle Terre's
zoning ordinance was constitutional because it "only" prohibited unre-
lated individuals from living together while East Cleveland's ordinance
was unconstitutional because it sliced deeply into the family itself.59 While
acknowledging that the family is not beyond governmental regulation, the
Court held that, when the government intrudes on choices concerning
family living arrangements, courts must carefully examine the governmen-
tal interest involved and the extent to which they are furthered by the
challenged ordinance.6"
In an opinion surprisingly similar to Justice Marshall's Belle Terre
dissent, the Court determined that the East Cleveland zoning ordinance
only minimally attained its goals of minimizing traffic and parking con-
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 20.
58. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
59. Id. at 498.
60. Id. at 499.
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gestion, avoiding financial burdens on its school system and preventing
overcrowding.6' "For example, the ordinance permits any family consist-
ing only of husband, wife, and unmarried children to live together, even if
the family contains a half dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own
car. At the same time it forbids an adult brother and sister to share a
household, even if both faithfully use public transportation. 61 2 Because
the ordinance did not further the desired governmental objectives and be-
cause it seriously intruded on family relations, the Court held that the
ordinance was constitutionally invalid. The Court dismissed East Cleve-
land's argument that only the nuclear family has a constitutional right to
live together and noted that the nation's tradition of family life includes
"uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandchildren sharing a household
along with parents and children. 63
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion provides useful arguments for
alternative family members challenging zoning ordinances that restrict
household composition to individuals related by blood, marriage or adop-
tion. After carefully examining numerous state court cases that overturned
zoning ordinances prohibiting unrelated persons from occupying single-
family households,64 Stewart stated that the state cases correctly delineated
61. Id. at 499-500.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 503-504.
64. Id. at 516-19 nf. 7-14 (Stewart, J. concurring). Two of the cases Justice Stewart
cited are particularly important for alternative family members to use in challenging zon-
ing ordinances. In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966),
the Illinois Supreme Court decided a case brought by four unrelated men challenging the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that defined "family" as one or more persons each
related by blood, marriage or adoption. In overturning the ordinance, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted:
[W]hen other courts have been called upon to define the term 'family' they have
emphasized the single housekeeping unit aspect of the term, rather than the rela-
tionship of the occupants .... In terms of permissible zoning objectives, a group
of persons bound together only by their common desire to operate a single house-
keeping unit, might be thought to have a transient quality that would affect ad-
versely the stability of the neighborhood, and so depreciate the value of other
property. An ordinance requiring relationship by blood, marriage or adoption
could be regarded as tending to limit the intensity of land use and it might be
considered that a group of unrelated persons would be more likely to generate
traffic and parking problems than would an equal number of related persons.
But none of these observations reflect a universal truth. Family groups are
mobile today, and not all family groups are internally stable and well-disci-
plined. Family groups with two or more cars are not unfamiliar. And so far as
intensity of use is concerned, the definition in the present ordinance, with its
reference to the 'respective spouses' of persons related by blood, marriage or
adoption, can hardly be regarded as an effective control on the size of family
units.
The General Assembly has not specifically authorized the adoption of zon-
ing ordinances that penetrate so deeply as this one does into the internal compo-
sition of a single housekeeping unit. Until it has done so, we are of the opinion
that we should not read the general authority that it has delegated to attend so
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the extent to which zoning ordinances can permissibly interfere with a
property owner's right to determine the internal composition of his or her
household.65 Although a municipality may want to prevent overcrowding
and traffic congestion, Stewart determined that attacking these problems
by restricting household composition was using a means not reasonably
related to achieving the desired ends. 6 He noted that trying to solve these
problems by using a restrictive definition of family was "like burn[ing] the
house to roast the pig."'6 7 To be a valid exercise of its police power, a
municipality must use more direct means to resolve problems of over-
crowding and traffic congestion.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Euclid, Belle Terre, and Moore
delineate municipalities' authority to establish single-family neighbor-
hoods. In order for a zoning ordinance to be valid under the federal con-
stitution, it must not impinge on the right of traditional nuclear and ex-
tended families to live together. The Belle Terre decision does indicate
that municipalities can constitutionally exclude unrelated individuals from
single-family neighborhoods, although it does not directly address whether
alternative families can be excluded also. The dissenting and concurring
decisions in Belle Terre and East Cleveland, respectively, lay out consti-
tutional arguments useful to alternative families trying to specifically ob-
tain the right to live in single-family neighborhoods with traditional nu-
clear and extended families.
B. Lower Court Cases Extending Protections to Alternative Families.
Lower court cases, both before and after Belle Terre and Moore,
have specifically granted alternative families the right to live in single-
family neighborhoods. These cases have struck down zoning ordinances
that restricted single-family neighborhoods to families related by blood,
marriage or adoption or limited numbers of unrelated individuals. Careful
far.
Id. at 436-38, 216 N.E.2d at 119-120.
In the other case, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered overturning a zoning
ordinance that attempted to address problems of excessive noise, overcrowding, intoxication
and wild parties by prohibiting summer rentals to unrelated individuals. In Kirsch Hold-
ing Company v. Borough of Marasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 n.6, 281 A.2d 513, 518 n.6
(1971) the court held that:
Until compelled to do so by a New Jersey precedent squarely on point, this court
will not conclude that persons who have economic or personal reasons for living
together as a bonafide single housekeeping unit and who have no other orienta-
tion, commit a zoning violation, with possible penal consequences, just because
they are not related.
65. Moore, 431 U.S. at 518-519.
66. Id. at 520 n.16.
67. Id. citing Larson v. Mayor, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 374, 240 A.2d 31, 36 (1968).
For a detailed discussion of pre-Belle Terre state cases, See, Note, Burning the House to
Roast the Pig: Unrelated Individuals and Single Family Zoning's Blood Relation Crite-
rion, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 138 (1972).
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examination of these cases establishes why alternative families in some
states have gained the same right as traditional families to live in single-
family neighborhoods. The first case discussed bases its decision on federal
constitutional rights; the last three cases presented base their decisions on
state constitutional rights.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Belle Terre, the Eastern Dis-
trict Court of Wisconsin, in Timberlake v. Kenkel68 held that a zoning
ordinance restricting single-family neighborhoods to traditional families or
two unrelated persons over 62 violated the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment. Although Timberlake was implicitly overruled by the Su-
preme Court's Belle Terre decision, its discussion of protections based on
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment is persuasive in ques-
tioning the applicability of Belle Terre to situations where alternative
families are excluded from single-family neighborhoods.
In Timberlake, two married couples and their children, who were
unrelated by blood or marriage, challenged a Village of Shorewood zoning
ordinance which prohibited them from living together. The Village's zon-
ing ordinance defined a "family" as "an individual, or 2 or more persons
related by blood, marriage or legal adoption, or a group of not more than
3 persons who need not be related by blood, marriage or legal adoption,
living together in a dwelling unit."69 The plaintiffs claimed that this fam-
ily definition violated their right to equal protection under the 14th
Amendment because it denied them the right to live together while al-
lowing similarly situated families related by blood, marriage or adoption
to live together.
The court first determined that neither a suspect classification nor a
fundamental interest was involved, and thus the question was whether the
legislative distinction between related and unrelated individuals was arbi-
trary and without a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objec-
tive.70 It went on to note that the equal protection clause requires all leg-
islative classifications to rest on some difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the legislation's objectives so that all similarly situ-
ated persons were treated alike. 1 In claiming that its distinction between
related and unrelated individuals was constitutional, the Village asserted
that the ordinance was rationally related to the legitimate goals of (1)
preserving the residential nature of the Village, (2) preserving the Vil-
lage's residential property values, and (3) establishing population density
control."2 The court interpreted the Village's asserted goals to be based on
68. 369 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D. WI 1974).
69. Id. at 458-459.
70. Id. at 464.
71. Id. at 464-65.
72. Id. at 465. The court rejected the Village's assertion that a fourth goal of preserv-
ing the Village's high moral character existed because the Village did not seriously argue
that single-family housing as defined by the ordinance preserved the high moral character
of the community. Id. This goal, however, is one municipalities frequently assert and
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three assumptions: (1) that single families were more likely than volun-
tary families to preserve the residential character of the Village; (2) that
single families were more likely than voluntary families to preserve resi-
dential property values in the Village; and (3) that single families were
more likely than voluntary families to be smaller in size and therefore
control population density.73
The court stated that its analysis was guided by United States Dept.
of Agriculture v. Moreno 4 in which the Supreme Court held that section
3(e) of the Food Stamp Act was unconstitutional because it differentiated
between two classes of households, one composed of individuals related to
each other and the other composed of individuals unrelated to each other.
The Moreno Court held that "this distinction between 'related' and 'unre-
lated' persons [is] wholly without any rational basis and therefore [is] in-
valid under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 7 5 By using
the Moreno analysis, the Timberlake court determined that the zoning or-
dinance, which also differentiated between related and unrelated persons,
was without any rational basis and was therefore unconstitutional. 6
The court, after examining other sections of the ordinance and after
examining each of the Village's asserted goals, held that no rational basis
existed for the ordinance and that less onerous means could be used to
achieve the Village's goals.77 After referring to other sections of the zoning
ordinance, the court determined that the Village could use those sections,
rather than single-family zoning, to attain its goals of preserving residen-
tial character, property values, and population density control. 8 The
court carefully considered the assumptions behind the Village's goals and
noted that the Village had not presented any evidence substantiating its
assumptions.79 Without any evidence to substantiate the assumptions, the
courts handling these cases should, like the Timberlake court, require evidentiary substan-
tiation before accepting the assertion.
73. Id. The court used the term "voluntary families" to refer to families which were
unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption.
74. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See, supra fn. 51.
75. Timberlake, 369 F. Supp. at 466.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 467.
78. Id. at 466. It referred to sections that prohibited erection of coops or pens for
animals; prohibited rooming houses, filling stations, businesses, churches or other commer-
cial buildings; and required large lots, single dwellings on lots and height regulations.
These sections, the court stated, more directly achieved the stated goals than did the "fam-
ily" definition contained in the zoning ordinance. Id.
79. Id. at 467. First, the Village's view that voluntary families would not preserve the
residential character of the community was based on speculation and not supported by
evidence. The court stated that the set-back requirements, size of lot and building height
regulations were more rationally related to preserving residential character than was the
restrictive family definition. Second, the Village's assertion that the restrictive family defi-
nition provided a stable community of citizens which prevented inflated property values
and inflated rentals was also based on speculation and not supported by the evidence.
Finally, the Village's contention that the restrictive family definition was necessary to con-
trol population density was also not supported by the evidence. The court noted that the
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court reasoned that the Village was merely speculating that the restrictive
family definition would help it to achieve its goals.80
The Timberlake decision is an excellent example of how the Supreme
Court could have decided the Belle Terre case using a federal constitu-
tional analysis. It may also indicate how the Supreme Court might decide
a future case that raised the issue of whether alterntive families, as op-
posed to unrelated individuals, can be constitutionally zoned out of single-
family neighborhoods.
In cases following the Supreme Court's decision in Belle Terre, state
courts declaring zoning ordinances unconstitutional due to their restrictive
definition of family have turned to bases other than the federal constitu-
tion for their legal support. Usually, they have turned to the due process
clause or the privacy clause in their own state constitutions. Three exam-
ples of state courts using state constitutions to overturn restrictive family
definitions in zoning ordinances are Charter Township of Delta v. Di-
nolfo,81 McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay,82 and City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson. 3 Examining these cases shows how state courts have rejected
the reasoning behind the Belle Terre decision and have concluded that
alternative families, like traditional families, have a constitutional right to
live together in single-family neighborhoods.8 4
In Charter Township, the zoning ordinance prohibited the defend-
ants from including six unrelated individuals in their households. Each
household consisted of a husband and wife, children, and six unrelated
adults. They were members of The Work of Christ Community and they
adopted their lifestyle as a means of living out their Christian commit-
ment.85 While agreeing with the Township that ensuring the neighbor-
hood's residential nature was a permissible object for a zoning ordinance,
the court determined that the ordinance did not further that goal and it
rejected the Township's assumption that different, and undesirable, be-
havior could be expected from a functional family as opposed to a tradi-
tional family.80
The court stressed that using the traditional family for determining
permissive occupancy was both overinclusive and underinclusive.
The fatal flaw in attempting to maintain a stable residential neighbor-
hood through the use of criteria based upon biological or legal relation-
ships is that such classifications operate to prohibit a plethora of uses
which pose no threat to the accomplishment of the end sought to be
ordinance's limit of three unrelated individuals was actually lower than the size of the
average nuclear family. Id.
80. Id.
81. 419 Mich. 253, 351 N.W.2d 831 (1984).
82. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 488 N.E.2d 1240 (1985).
83. 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436 (1980).
84. See, also, State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 369 (1979).
85. Charter Township, 419 Mich. at 253, 351 N.W.2d at 834.
86. Id. at 270-271, 351 N.W.2d at 841. The court referred to the unrelated individu-
als in the households as a functional family.
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achieved. Moreover, such a classification system legitimizes many uses
which defeat that goal. Plainfield's ordinance, for example, would pro-
hibit a group of five unrelated widows, widowers, older spinsters or
bachelors-or even of judges from residing in a single unit within the
municipality . . . . On the other hand, a group of ten distant cousins
could so reside without violating the ordinance. Thus the ordinance dis-
tinguishes between acceptable and prohibited uses on grounds which
may, in many cases, have no rational relationship to the problem sought
to be ameliorated.87 (footnotes omitted)
The Township responded by arguing that it had no interest in keep-
ing a certain group of unrelated persons together while it did have a clear
interest in preserving the integrity of the biological or legal family.88
While agreeing that the Township had no particular interest in keeping a
group of unrelated individuals together, the court noted that it also had no
business keeping them apart absent a valid reason for doing so.89 The
Township did not establish that "unrelated persons, as such, have any less
a need for the advantages of residential living or that they have as a group
behavior patterns that are more opprobrious than the population at
large." 90 Without such evidence, the ordinance was arbitrary and capri-
cious under the due process clause of the Michigan Constitution.9 '
The court referred to other zoning ordinances which offered innova-
tive approaches to preserving the family character of a neighborhood
without arbitrarily excluding groups not inimical to that goal. It cited an
ordinance which described "family" as:
a. One or more persons related by blood or marriage occupying a
dwelling unit and living as a single, nonprofit housekeeping unit.
b. A collective number of individuals living together in one house under
one head, whose relationship is of a permanent distinct domestic
character, and cooking as a single housekeeping unit. This definition
shall not include any society, club, fraternity, sorority, association,
lodge, combine, federation, group, coterie, or organization, which is
not a recognized religious order, nor include a group of individuals
whose association is temporary and resort-seasonal in character or
nature. 92
The court also referred to an ordinance that defined "family" as:
"a single individual doing his [or her] own cooking and living upon the
premises as a separate housekeeping unit, or a collective body of persons
87. Id. at 274, 351 N.W.2d at 842. The court also noted "twenty male cousins could
live together, motorcycles, noise and all, while three unrelated clerics could not." Id.
88. Id. citing Town of Durham v. White Enterprises Inc., 115 N.H. 645, 649, 348
A.2d 706, 709 (1975).
89. Charter Township, 419 Mich. at 274-275, 351 N.W.2d at 842.
90. Id. at 275, 351 N.W.2d at 842.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 278 n.7, 351 N.W.2d at 844 citing Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of
Manesquan, 59 N.J. 241, 247, 281 A.2d 513, 516 (1971).
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doing their own cooking and living together upon the premises as a sepa-
rate housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship based upon birth, mar-
riage or other domestic bond as distinguished from a group occupying a
boarding house, lodging house, club, fraternity or hotel."' 3
These ordinances would meet a municipality's need for establishing resi-
dential neighborhoods without prohibiting alternative families from living
in those neighborhoods. The court held that the zoning ordinance's "fam-
ily" definition violated the Michigan Constitution's due process clause be-
cause it limited household composition in a manner not rationally related
to its stated goals."'
In a similar and more recent case, the New York Court of Appeals
reached the same result in McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay.9 5 In that case,
the plaintiffs were owners and tenants of a four bedroom house who were
cited for violating Oyster Bay's zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance
restricted single family housing to any number of persons related by
blood, marriage or adoption or to two persons not so related but who were
62 or older."6 The court held that the ordinance, on its face, violated the
due process and equal protection clauses of the New York constitution, as
well as New York's Human Rights Law. 7
The court laid out a two-prong test for determining whether a zoning
ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power: (1) it must have been
enacted in furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) there
must be a 'reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved by
the regulation and the means used to achieve that end.""8 If the ordinance
failed either part of the test, it was unreasonable and constituted a depri-
vation of property without the due process of law."9
93. Charter Township, 419 Mich. at 278 n.7, 351 N.W.2d at 844 citing Penobscot
Area Housing Development Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 20 (Me. 1981).
94. Charter Township at 278, 351 N.W.2d at 844. In response to the Dinolfo deci-
sion, East Lansing, Michigan began studying its zoning ordinance to ensure that it was
constitutional. After obtaining advice from its City Attorney that the ordinance only had to
allow functional families, not all unrelated individuals, to live in single-family neighbor-
hoods, the Planning Commission adopted a draft ordinance defining functional families.
That definition stated: "Functional family shall mean a group of persons other than a
family occupying a dwelling as a single, non-profit housekeeping unit, whose relationship
is of permanent and distinct domestic character and who shares common culinary facilities.
Functional family shall not include any fraternity, sorority, cooperative, club, society, asso-
ciation, lodge, organization, boarders, lodgers, roomers or foster care home nor shall it
include any group of persons whose association is merely temporary, social, politically
commercial or economic in nature." See, Task Force Report, supra fn. 1, at section G,
pages 2-16.
95. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 488 N.E.2d 1240 (1985).
96. Id. at 546-47, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 129, 488 N.E.2d at 1241.
97. Id. at 549, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130, 488 N.E.2d at 1241.
98. Id. at 548-549, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130, 488 N.E.2d at 1242. The court began its
examination of the zoning ordinance by noting that ordinances, like all other legislative
enactments, are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging the ordinance has
the burden to prove its unconstitutionality beyond a resonable doubt. Id.
99. Id. at 549, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 130, 488 N.E.2d at 1243.
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The court found that the ordinance was enacted to further several
legitimate governmental purposes, including preserving the character of
traditional single-family neighborhoods, reducing parking and traffic
problems, controlling population density and preventing noise and distur-
bances.' 00 However, the question in the case centered on whether the
means chosen by Oyster Bay were reasonably related to achieving the or-
dinance's ends. The court concluded that they were not.' 0 '
The court held that "restricting occupancy of single-family housing
based generally on the biological or legal relationships between its inhabi-
tants bears no reasonable relationship to the goals" of the ordinance.'0 2
Zoning is 'intended to control types of housing and living and not the
genetic or intimate internal family relations of human beings' . . . and if
a household is 'the functional and factual equivalent of a natural family'
... the ordinance may not exclude it from a single-family neighborhood
and still serve a valid purpose. 03
According to the court, zoning ordinances can constitutionally restrict the
definition of "family" to include various circumstances and relationships
only if the ordinance also contains an alternative definition of family to
cover any number of unrelated persons living together who are the func-
tional equivalent of a traditional family.'"
Thus the New York State Constitution requires that unrelated indi-
viduals who are a functional equivalent of the traditional family must be
treated the same as a traditional family under zoning ordinances.'0 5 Alter-
native families have a state constitutional right to share single-family
neighborhoods with traditional families. Zoning ordinances which try to
exclude those alternative families will be declared unconstitutional.
The California Constitution also protects alternative families. How-
ever, the basis for this protection flows from its newly-enacted privacy
clause, not from the due process or equal protection clauses as in Michi-
gan and New York. In City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, the California
100. Id. at 549, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131, 488 N.E.2d at 1243. See, also, Annotation,
Validity of Ordinance Restricting Number of Unrelated Persons Who Can Live Together
in Residential Zone, 12 A.L.R. 4th 238 (1976).
101. McMinn, 66 N.Y.2d at 549, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131, 488 N.E.2d at 1243.
102. Id. The court pointed out that the goals of the ordinance could be achieved by
restrictions on the size of the dwelling and the lot and the number of people occupying it
and the ordinance, as written, was both over inclusive and under inclusive. Id.
103. Id. citing Group House of Port Washington, Incor. v. Board of Zoning & Ap-
peals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 272-273, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380, 380 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1978) and
City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452, 313
N.E.2d 756, 758 (1974).
104. McMinn, 66 N.Y.2d at 549-50, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131, 488 N.E.2d at 1244. The
functional equivalent of a traditional family exhibits some of the following indicia: perma-
nent and not transient arrangement; intention to remain and develop ties in the commu-
nity; stable, uncongested environment; and maintenance of a single housekeeping unit. City
of White Plains, 34 N.Y.2d at 305-6, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53, 313 N.E.2d at 757-58.
105. McMinn, 66 N.Y.2d at 550, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 131-32, 488 N.E.2d at 1244.
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Supreme Court held that the California Constitution's privacy right pro-
hibited zoning ordinances restricting the number of unrelated individuals
living together as an "alternate family" in a single-family neighborhood
while not equally restricting traditional families.1"6
The Appellants were three of twelve adult residents living in a 24-
room, 10-bedroom, 6-bathroom house in a single-family neighborhood.
They considered themselves to be an alternative family with social, eco-
nomic and psychological commitments to each other. They shared ex-
penses, rotated chores, ate evening meals together, shared recreational ac-
tivities and contributed to improving the house. They functioned as a
family because they shared "the same values and interactions as a tradi-
tional family: love, respect, unity and cohesiveness."""7 They were cited
for violating Santa Barbara's zoning ordinance which defined "family" as
individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption or not more than five
unrelated persons.
As did the other decisions noted above, the court's inquiry began with
a determination that the restrictive family definition was not justified by
the city's interest in serving the public health, safety, comfort and general
welfare."" The court specifically noted that "[iun general, zoning ordi-
nances are much less suspect when they focuus on the use than when they
command inquiry into who are the users."1 0 9
The court held that the right to privacy under the California Consti-
tution included the right of persons to make intimate life style decisions
free from unnecessary government interference.1 1 In terms of a restrictive
zoning ordinance, whether the right to privacy protected unrelated persons
living in a single-family neighborhood depended on how closely they re-
sembled a traditional family.1 "The more closely the values pursued re-
semble those of a traditional family, the more likely the decision to live
together will be protected by the right to privacy." '12
The Adamson case is significant to alternative families because it ac-
106. 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436 (1980). Although the Supreme Court referred
to the appellants as an "alternate family", Id. at 541, 610 P.2d at 438, they will be re-
ferred to as an alternative family herein to remain consistent with the language used
throughout. For an excellent discussion of the case and its position in the line of other
California privacy decisions, see Note, City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson; New Protection
for Alternate Life Style Decisions, 14 Loyola of L.A. L. Rev. 359 (1981). [hereinafter
Alternate Life Style].
107. Alternate Life Style supra fn. 106 at 361 n.11.
108. City of Santa Barbara, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543, 610 P.2d at 440. The court re-
jected, as illegitimate, any assumption behind the zoning ordinance that groups of unre-
lated persons cause an immoral environment for families with children. Id.
109. Id. at 544-45, 610 P.2d at 441-442.
110. Alternate Life Style supra fn. 106 at 359.
111. Id. at 371. Two factors to be used in determining whether unrelated individuals
shared the charateristics of a family are whether the individuals have social, economic and
psychological commitments to one another and whether emotional support and stability are
provided to one another. Id.
112. Id.
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knowledges that any number of unrelated individuals can be the func-
tional equivalent of a traditional family if they have the same values and
interactions that a traditional family has. Zoning ordinances, attempting
to establish single-family neighborhoods, must address the needs and
rights of alternative families to live in those neighborhoods. Alternative
families, like traditional families, desire to live with other families where
family values and family needs are supported. Those family values and
needs, as the cases above establish, are not restricted to families related by
blood, marriage or adoption. They extend to alternative families and al-
ternative families demand access to them.
C. Local Legislation to Expand Family Definitions in Zoning
Ordinances
While studying the possibility of enacting a Madison, Wisconsin, or-
dinance which would provide benefits to alternative families, expanding
the zoning ordinance's family definition to include alternative families was
one of the most controversial issues. Although such an expansion would
not have any significant economic impact (as did the other controversial
issue11 ), much concern was expressed by city council members and neigh-
borhood associations about the possible negative effects of a broadened
family definition."1 Any challenge to the current zoning ordinance that
protects single-family neighborhoods from an onslaught of transient stu-
dents with their accompanying parties, noise and cars was viewed as a
serious threat to Madison's peaceful family neighborhoods. 5
Once the proposed definition of an alternative family changed from
the original recommendation of "two or more adults ... plus dependents"
to "two adults ... plus dependents", the concerns of the council members
and the neighborhood associations dropped. Those concerns centered on
the problems associated with large student households and the parking
and noise problems believed to travel with them. There did not seem to be
a concern that an alternative family, as differentiated from unrelated col-
lege students, would move into the traditional family neighborhoods.
This may not be the typical response, however, from all communities.
Many communities may hope, under the guise of objecting to noise or
113. The other controversial issue was extending employer-based family health in-
surance to alternative families. See, fns. 17 to 160, infra, and accompanying text.
114. Neighborhood associations in Madison are strong, vocal parts of the community
and much work in renovating and maintaining family neighborhoods has come through
neighborhood association activism. These associations and their members were particularly
concerned that the alternative families ordinance would become a vehicle for student
groups, whether fraternities, sororities, communes or student households, to spread into
single-family neighborhoods from their traditional sites in "student ghettos".
115. See, Task Force Report, supra fn. 1 at section E, Minutes of February 23, 1984
meeting, pgs. 1-4; section H, pg 5 [Statement of Dungeon-Monroe Neighborhood Associa-
tion]; pg. 10 [Letter from Greater Madison Board of Realtors, Inc.]; pg. 32 [letter from
Madison Apartment Association]; and Section J, pgs. 51-53.
[Vol. 2:1
ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES
parking, that they can keep alternative families out of their neighborhoods
and not have a different family-type next door. That these fears exist in
some communities is evident from examining the zoning cases discussed
above and should not be ignored or minimized.
Examination of the above zoning cases does establish, however, that
the proposed Madison definition of an alternative family with its self-
imposed limitation to "two adults plus dependents" falls woefully
short of the possibilities to which it could aspire at least for the purposes
of redefining "family" within the zoning ordinance. As the cases of Kirsch
Holding Company and Penobscot Area Housng show,116 much broader
definitions are possible which would expand the possible living situations
available to alternative families with more than two adult members while
still addressing the legitimate fears of all-night parties, non-existent park-
ing spaces and transient populations. The proposed Madison ordinance
takes a step toward ending discrimination against alternative families by
expanding the zoning definition of "family" to include some alternative
families, but it does not go as far as possible toward ending the prohibi-
tions that affect all alternative families on a daily, hourly basis-their
choice, and the restriction on that choice, of where to make their home.
III. Obtaining Traditional Family Employment Benefits for
Alternative Families
In addition to challenging zoning ordinances which prohibit them
from living in single-family neighborhoods, alternative families are also
seeking those benefits normally connected with employment that tradi-
tional families regularly receive. These benefits include access to family
health insurance coverage, parenting and bereavement leave, sick leave to
care for a family member, pension benefits, recreational or day care bene-
fits, moving expenses, and reduced travel costs. Alternative families are
trying to obtain these benefits through litigation, legislation and collective
bargaining.
These benefits are not simply "fringe" benefits. They often consist of
up to forty percent of an employer's average personnel costs.11 ' Addition-
ally, and perhaps more importantly for alternative families, receiving
these benefits tends to make a family stronger, healthier and more sta-
ble.11 ' Receiving benefits allows the individual to acknowledge the impor-
tance of his or her family and to receive societal support and acknowl-
edgement for that family
Alternative families attempting to obtain these benefits may encoun-
ter employer and insurance companies concerns, as well as hostility from
116. See, supra fns. 82 and 83 and accompanying text.
117 Friend and Liberty, Recognizing Lesbian and Gay Families: Strateges for Ex-
tending Employment Benefit Coverage, 2 (Lesbian Rights Project, San Francisco, CA
1985) [hereinafter cited as Friend and Liberty].
118. Id. at 3.
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citizen organizations not wanting to extend coverage to gay and lesbian
families and unmarried heterosexual families. Employer concerns will
center around two main issues: will the extension of benefits incur costs
for the employer and will the extension of benefits require additional
paperwork119 The simple answer to both concerns is "yes." But the more
complete answer is that it cannot be determined exactly how large the cost
or paperwork will be for a given employer. It is impossible to accurately
estimate the number of employees and families who would take advantage
of these benefits and what increased costs would be involved. The in-
creased cost from extending benefits to alternative families will vary sub-
stantially from employer to employer depending on the make-up of its
employees' families and the percentage of employees who take advantage
of the benefits. Current studies indicate, however, that the expected cost
will range between 1 and 4 percent of the employer's overall cost of
benefits.12
0
Insurance company concerns are slightly more difficult to address.121
119. Id. at 14-15.
120. In a survey conducted by the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, 2,204
City of Madison employees were given surveys in their paycheck envelopes. Twenty-six
percent of the employees (568) returned the survey and ten percent of those (59) indicated
that they were part of an alterntive family. Of the 59 indicating they were alternative
family members, 66% indicated they would apply for family group health insurance bene-
fits if the benefits were available, 10% indicated they would not apply for such benefits,
and 24% indicated they were uncertain. Based on an annual increased employer cost of
$1,338.36 for conversion of single insurance to family insurance and based on a range of
from 24 employees (actual survey respondents requesting family benefits who currently
had single insurance) to 91 employees (estimating 10% of total city workforce minus the 34
percent of them who did not want coverage and minus the 17 percent of them who were
already covered by family insurance), the estimated increased cost to the City of Madison,
as an employer, would range from .85% to 3.8% of its annual budget for health insurance.
(1986 budget of $3,759,000.00). See, Survey of City of Madison Employees, Madison
Equal Opportunities Commission May 12, 1986.
121. While studying the extension of health insurance benefits to alternative families,
the Madison E.O.C. mailed questionnaires to major insurance companies doing business in
Wisconsin. Concerns expressed by insurance companies responding include: need for de-
tailed criteria for alternative family membership, administrative problems in determining
alternative family status, increased and perhaps prohibitive cost of providing coverage, ad-
verse selection, increase in insurers' potential risk or exposure, question of whether
favorable federal tax treatment of employer-contribution for alternative family members
would be allowed and extent of alternative family members' rights for assignment of bene-
fits and release of medical information. See, Survey Responses of Insurance Companies,
Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, October 5, 1985-January 15, 1986.
In a discussion with the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, representatives
from the State of Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance raised concerns about obtaining
the detailed claims experience insurance companies use for rate-setting, need for a separate
rate structure for alternative families until claim experience can be analyzed, AIDS or
other "lifestyle" factors that might affect claims, adverse selection, and possible state or
federal preemption. The representatives indicated that, although insurance companies may
tend to resist coverage of alternative families, "blind" prejudice would probably not be a
concern. They also indicated a belief that most insurance companies would not refuse to
provide coverage to currently-covered employers just to void providing alternative family
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An insurance company's main goal is usually clear-maintaining an ac-
ceptable profit margin.1 22 However, maintaining this profit margin is
based on two major factors: avoiding adverse selection and avoiding fraud-
ulent claims.1 23 Adverse selection occurs when insurance beneficiaries are
chosen because they are sick, not because of some objective criteria.124
Marriage has provided a convenient basis by which an insurance company
can extend coverage, and avoid adverse selection, because of the belief that
few persons would marry simply to obtain insurance coverage. 126 Adverse
selection could occur if employees could designate any beneficiary under
his or her health insurance policy. Thus, for example, insurance compa-
nies fear that an employee with a very ill cousin and a healthy partner
would choose to cover the cousin whose health insurance costs would be
substantially higher than the partner's costs would be.'26 Before extending
health insurance coverage, insurance companies would want to determine
that the beneficiary designation was based on some objective criteria, usu-
coverage. See, Task Force Report, section M, pgs. 1-2. One insurance company surveyed
did state, however, if premium costs increased substantially from providing coverge to al-
ternative families, it may no longer be able to offer insurance coverage to employers within
Madison. Id.
122. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at 16.
123. Id.
124. Sexual Orientation and the Law § 5.04[1][d][iij (R. Achtenberg, ed. 1985)
[hereinafter referred to as Achtenberg].
125. Id. It is possible that unmrried heterosexual couples may decide to marry to
obtain benefits since they are already living together as an alternative family. Bruce Hell-
mich of the North Farm Cooperative in Madison, a wholesale natural foods warehouse,
testified that a male employee had requested insurance coverage for his unmarried female
partner. North Farm's insurer refused coverage because the couple was unmarried; there-
after the couple did marry and insurance coverge ws provided. See, Task Force Report,
supra fn. 1 at section E, minutes of June 21, 1984, p.1 . Thus, providing benefits to alter-
native families would eliminate this reason for marrying, a positive step toward ending
marriages based on convenience or receiving benefits.
126. Under the original Madison task force's definition, there was the additional fear
that, with an unlimited number of adults able to register as an alternative family, each
employee could potentially cover an unlimited number of adults under his or her em-
ployer's insurance policy. There were fears of 20 adults joining together as a family simply
to take advantage of one member's insurance benefits. See, Task Force Report, supra fn.
1, at Section E, Minutes of June 21, 1984. The task force addressed this fear by limiting
the extension of employer-based benefits to one "spouse equivalent" plus children which
would correlate to the traditional nuclear family. However, if family size were unrestricted
by the number of adults, adverse selection could still result because the designated "spouse
equivalent" could be the family member with the highest health costs. This concern is one
of the reasons that the Madison EOC changed its alternative family definition to include
only "two adults . . . plus dependents" so that adverse selection presumably could not
occur. An additional safeguard would exist if, upon registration, alternative family mem-
bers were required to sign an affidavit stating that the adults were in a mutually suuppor-
tive committed relationship and stating that fraud charges could be brought if the regis-
trants established family based, for example, not on mutual support and commitment, but
rather on one member's need to obtain health insurance benefits. The City of Berkeley
Affidavit of Domestic Partnership includes this type of provision. Friend and Liberty,
supra fn. 117, at A-1.
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ally mutual support and commitment, other than health.127 They may
possibly increase rates for alternative family coverage until they could de-
termine, through actuarial studies and claims experience, whether alterna-
tive families were more expensive to insure than traditional families. 28
In addition to employer and insurance companies concerns which re-
late directly to the cost and administration of providing benefits, certain
individuals, groups and organizations will probably object on moral
grounds to extending traditional family benefits to alternative families.
These objections will relate to whether it is morally appropriate or so-
cially responsible to extend benefits beyond traditional families. Objections
will probably be based on the historical oppression of gay men and lesbi-
ans; 2' the perceived need to protect the traditional family from additional
threats, especially considering the increasing divorce rate; 3 0 and the con-
cern that the individuals living in these families do not abide by funda-
mentalist Christian values requiring the family to consist only of hetero-
sexual couples joined together by religious blessings at marriage along
with their children. These objections are raised fervently and supporters
of these ideas are often able to arouse substantial community support for
their beliefs. 1 ' Depending on the community involved, it may be possible
127. Id. at 16.
128. Rick Koven of Worker's Trust indicated that the company has not researched
their claims to determine whether alternative families ask more than traditional families to
insure. He said that it ws his opinion that such reserch would show very little difference in
the cost to insure alternative families but cautioned that his opinion was not backed by any
empirical reserch. Telephone conversation with Rick Koven on March 11, 1987.
129. See, Bowers v. Hardwick, supra fn. 25.
130. The divorce rate in the United Sttes was about forty percent (40%) according to
U.S. Bureau of Census statistics in 1979. Loss of Consortium, supra fn. 7, at 513 n.12.
According to Weitzman, the current divorce rate is at least forty-eight percent (48%) and
may actually be significantly higher. Weitzman, supra fn. 6, at 4-5.
131. During its study of the alternative family rights ordinance, the Madison E.O.C.
received substantial testimony from individuals objecting to the ordinances on moral or
religious grounds. Excerpts from that testimony are reprinted below:
I would like to speak against this legislation which you are trying to push
through. I am a Christian which I am not ashamed of. I am sorry for those that
don't believe in what God in His word about man and women had said. 'They
are to marry.' Genesis 2:24 .... This is what we would call a family. So I am
against anything or anyone that wants to change that .... And why should we
have two men and children, or two women and children, living together calling
themselves families .... So let's not do away with the American family which
has made America what it is or was ....
[Testimony of Francis Cutler, Task Force Report, supra fn. 1 at section E, minutes of
October 18, 1984, p. 1]
If this [ordinance] passes, what we know now as family, as men and women and
children, is going to be a mess because in the word of God, 'man and woman
should leave their father and mother and cleave together and be of one flesh.' It
says also in Genesis, 'be fruitful and multiply.' Two men or two women cannot
do that. They can't have children .... I believe this should not pass and that is
morally wrong ....
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to directly address these objections and attempt to win the battle for
favorable public opinion by pointing out that fairness and equity require
the extension of benefits and morality-based religious beliefs should not be
allowed to deflect from the need of alternative families to obtain these
benefits.1"2
By looking at the historical basis for extending employment benefits
to traditional families and by looking at the current attempts and successes
in obtaining benefits for alternative families through litigation, legislation
[Testimony of Jeanette Williams, Id. at 2.]
Now, I see this proposed ordinance another step in the breakdown of [the mar-
riage] commitment and of that kind of true responsibility between one another.
What people seem to be looking for is really a much easier way out of a relation-
ship and more of a way not to be committed under the guise of being committed,
and that they still want all the benefits that come from committed relationships.
[Testimony of Ted Geier, Task force Report, supra fn. 1 at section J, pgs. 5-6.]
[W]e must keep the political sanction in this nation such that we will keep our
society primarily composed of nuclear families .... I definitely believe that the
sanction in our society and in our nation must stay with the traditional nuclear
family, otherwise I see that the stability of nonnuclear relationships is in the
majority of instances is not very stable . . . And I believe the stability of our
society is resting on whether or not the primary relationships in our nation are
going to be based on a marriage commitment or not. I would definitely urge you
not to go ahead with this sort of legislation because I believe it is detrimental to
our city, state, and our whole nation, to our society.
[Testimony of Derek Miller, Id. at 22-24].
Tradition has taught me that it takes a male and a female to make babies and
babies make a family. Without a traditional male and female family unit in the
United States, I don't see where this legislation should even be addressing the
issue of family, because a family will not exist where there is no way to produce
a family .... I say if you want to see a peaceful society, I say, I'm in opposition
to this, and I say get back to the basic family and let's see the nation get back on
its feet.
[Testimony of Jay Punston, Id. at 48.]
132. Friend and Liberty point out two basic approaches or philosophies behind ex-
tending benefit coverage to alternative family members. (They refer only to gay and les-
bian couples but for purposes of this article, the same philosophies exist for extending
coverage to all alternative families). The "comparable or equal pay" analysis is relatively
straightforward: when traditional family members are given certain benefits, alternative
family members should receive the same benefits. Otherwise, alternative family members
will be receiving less overall compensation than their traditional family co-workers. When
one considers that some traditional family members receive substantial benefits including
health and dental insurance, sick leave and bereavement leave, use of health or recreational
facilities, pension benefits, and moving expenses, it becomes clear that alternative family
members, doing exactly the same job, receive significantly less compensation.
The "purpose of the benefit" analysis focuses on the reasons certain types of employ-
ment benefits are provided. If benefits are provided to keep employees happy and produc-
tive, encourage them to remain with the company, allow them to meet their family com-
mitments or reward them for work well done, there is no reason to provide these benefits
only to employees who are also traditional family members. The same reasons to provide
benefits apply equally to alternative family members and thus benefits should be extended
to them. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at pgs. 7-8.
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and collective bargaining, it will be easier to understand the importance
alternative families place on extension of these benefits. It will also be-
come clear why, until these benefits are obtained, real justice and equality
among traditional families and alternative families will not exist.
A. A Historical Understanding of Employment-based Traditional Fam-
ily Benefits
Before World War II, employment benefits did not generally extend
to coverge of an employee's family members.133 These family members
were not employees and were not eligible for health insurance coverage
under group plans.13 After World War II, union influence increased and
employees grouped together to demand insurance coverage for their fami-
lies.1 5 Family health insurance coverage was, and still is, prohibitively
expensive for a family to purchase on its own, especially when compared
to the relatively minor expense when family health insurance is available
at group rates from a large employer.13 But due to the number of em-
ployees who were in traditional families and due to their power to pres-
sure employers into providing this benefit, many traditional families are
now covered by group health insurance.
133. Id. at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The inequity which results from denying employer goup health insurance cover-
age for employees' alternative families can be seen from the following example. If a single
alternative family consisting of a man, woman and their two children wanted to obtain
health insurance through one of the local health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in
Madison, Wisconsin, it would cost that family between $185.16 and $198.99 for the
monthly premium as of January, 1987. Obtaining even more extensive health insurance
coverage from the same HMOs as a University of Wisconsin employee would cost that
family no monthly premium at all. On an annual basis, the increased cost to the family for
having to obtain nonemployment-based health insurance would be between $2211.92 and
$2387.88 for the 1987 calendar year. (This example does not address the question of
whether the family would be able to obtain insurance coverage for their alternative family
or the additional cost that would result if it became necessary for one of the adults to
obtain single coverage while the other obtained family coverage for him or herself and
their two children.)
Many employees are unable to receive this significant employment benefit simply be-
cause they live in an alternative family rather than a traditional family. In addition to the
$2200 to $2400 yearly additional cost they must pay to insure their families, they also lose
a significant employment benefit. In the situation described above, the University of Wis-
consin pays approximately $190.00 in monthly health insurance premiums for every em-
ployee insuring his or her traditional family. This results in a $2280 yearly additional
benefit that the traditional family member employee receives. The alternative family mem-
ber employee is denied that significant benefit from the same employer.
For the employee in this situation, living in an alternative family results in a net cost
of $4700 on an annual basis. This blatantly unequal treatment results simply from the
employee's inability to insure his or her family through the employer's group health insur-
ance plan. Extending group health insurance benefits to alternative families is the only
was to remedy this inequity.
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However, the family structure has changed since World War II and
the typical family is no longer composed of a wage-earning spouse, a fi-
nancially dependent spouse, and children. For many families, two wage-
earner households are the norm1 37 and for others, family arrangements
are no longer based on marriage, the usual criteria for obtaining em-
ployer-based health insurance benefits. Contrary to arguments put for-
ward by some employers, insurance companies and fundmentalist groups,
it is historically inaccurate to contend that employers originally extended
benefits to traditional families in an attempt to support traditional families
and promote marriage.1"8 Employers extended these benefits because em-
loyees, who were members of traditional families, fought for and won the
benefits. Employers will be required to extend benefits in the future to
alternative families because employees who are members of alternative
families are fighting for and beginning to win these traditional family
benefits.
B. Current Availability of Alternative Family Benefits
Alternative family benefits are presently available from a limited
number of employers, organizations and municipalities. Currently, two
insurance companies have been offering insurance benefits to alternative
families and other self-insurance plans are also being offered by some em-
ployers.1" 9 Each plan specifies eligibility criteria for alternative family
137. In 1970, seventeen percent of American wives worked outside the home. By
1990, sixty-seven percent of all wives will be in the labor force. Weitzman, supra fn. 6, at
6.
138. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at 6.
139. The Workers Trust Company offers basic health insurance, major medical cov-
erage and life insurance to over 200 employers in the United States. Workers Trust is a
member-owned, cooperative run, nonprofit business offering insurance coverage to individ-
uals and democratically-run, progressive organizations. Until October 1986, its major med-
ical coverage was underwritten by Consumers United Insurance Company. At that time,
its underwriter was changed to Lincoln National Insurance Company. When this change
was made, Lincoln National refused to continue providing insurance to alternative fami-
lies. See, infra, fn. 140. Also, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company offers major medical,
hospital indemnity, accident and life insurance. Coverage provided by Liberty Mutual is
available through the American Psychological Association. Additionally, District 65 of the
United Auto Workers acts as a self-insured carrier for its members employed by the Vil-
lage Voice newspaper in New York City. Its coverage includes health, dental, disability
and life insurance. Id. at 34-36. The National Organization for Women also offers insur-
ance coverage to alternative family members. Rivera, supra fn. 8, at 391 n. 769.
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members.14 ° In December, 1984, the City of Berkeley became the first
municipality to provide benefits to its employees' "domestic partners."' 1
These employers, organizations and municipalities understand that
coverage is needed by a growing number of alternative families and their
experience in extending coverage will provide much-needed information to
other employers or groups considering an extension of benefits. Their ex-
perience with costs and actuarial information could provide reassurance to
other employers and insurance companies whose fears of adverse selection
or fraudulent claims presently keep them from providing similar
coverage. 1
42
140. For example, until October 1986, Workers' Trust extended coverage to the
"named partner" of an employee member who "permanently resides with the member in
the member's home and to the member's and named partner's children." Coverage by
Workers' Trust began after a three-month waiting period was met. Liberty Mutual is
extending coverage to "spouse equivalents" of American Psychological Association mem-
bers, during a three-year trial period which took effect in October, 1984. Spouse
equivalents must be unmarried, at least 21 years old, share the domicile of an unmarried
insured member, provide proof of good health and meet a one-year waiting period. The
Committee on Gay Concerns, which obtained the coverage through its efforts, is currently
trying to use verification forms in lieu of the waiting period, a period which married
members do not have to meet. The Village Voice, through its own self-insurance plan,
provides coverage to the "spouse equivalent" of any employee. Spouse equivalents must
have shared households for one year before coverage begins; married couples do not have
any waiting period before coverage begins. The Berkeley School Board extends benefits to
the "domestic partners" of its employees and all their dependents. On August 1, 1984, the
School Board began providing dental, bereavement and maternity/paternity leaves to its
employees and their domestic partners. The extension of medical benefits is currently be-
ing negotiated with the Board's insurance carriers. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at
35-39.
141. (Since that time, the City of West Hollywood has also extended coverage to its
employees.) In order to obtain domestic partner benefits, City of Berkeley employees and
their domestic partners must sign an "Affidavit of Domestic Partnership." The affidavit
states that the domestic partners reside together and share the common necessities of life,
are not married to anyone, are at least 18 years old, do not violate California consanguin-
ity laws, are each other's sole domestic partner, and are responsible for one another's com-
mon welfare. In addition, the partners agree to notify the City within 30 days of any
change in their domestic partnership by filing a "Statement of Termination of Domestic
Partnership" and agreeing to mail a copy of the statement of termination to the other
partner. The partners also must agree that any person, employer or company suffering a
loss due to a false statement made in the affidavit may bring a civil action against the
partners for payment of those losses, including reasonable attorney fees. The affidavit also
notes that the City is to use the affidavit solely for determining domestic partnership bene-
fits and that the information contained in the affidavit is confidential and will not be
relesed except by express authorization or under a court order. Id. at 39, A-1-A-3. As of
December, 1986, one percent of Berkeley employees had signed up for alternative family
medical insurance and four percent had signed up for alternative family dental insurance.
(According to Barbara Lightner of the Madison Institute for Social Legislation, the differ-
ence in the number of employees signed up for the two coverages was due to the quality of
the benefits involved. Conversation on November 26, 1986.)
142. For example, while discussing the possibility of extending alternative family
benefits to City employees, Madison Mayor Joseph Sensenbrenner indicated that he would
be interested in first finding out the City of Berkeley's experience with the number of
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C. Litigation Concerning Employment Benefits
Employees, whose employers do not extend employment-related ben-
efits to alternative family members, have begun using litigation in at-
tempts to obtain these benefits. In the only published case to reach an
appellate court system, Boyce Hinman and the Advocates for Gay and
Lesbian State Employees brought a suit against the California Depart-
ment of Personnel Administration claiming that family partners of gay
men and lesbian state employees should be eligible to receive dental
benefits.143
Hinman argued that the state's eligibility requirements for benefits
and its subsequent denial of benefits to the gay and lesbian employees'
family members distinguished between similarly situated heterosexual
families and homosexual families and thus violated the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution.1 44 However, the court held that
Hinman was not similarly situated with regard to heterosexual employees
with spouses, but rather was similarly situated with other unmarried em-
ployees.1,45 According to the court, granting benefits based on marital sta-
tus did not violate the fundamental rights of unmarried persons and there-
fore, statutory classifications based on marital status needed only to be
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose to survive judicial
scrutiny. 14
6
The court began by noting that the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting marriage and that marriage is promoted by conferring rights or
benefits to married persons which are unavailable to unmarried per-
sons. 147 No similar public policy existed for promoting nonmarital rela-
tionships and, in the absence of legislation granting equal benefits to
nonmarital relationships, no basis existed for extending to nonmarital re-
lations the preferred status granted to marital relations.'44 The court also
referred to the administrative difficulties that would result from requiring
an administrative agency to decide which alternative family relationships
employees requesting benefits, the increased cost of providing benefits and their insurance
claims experience before providing similar benefits to City employees. Author's discussion
with Mayor Joseph Sensenbrenner, November, 1986 while requesting that city employee
benefits for alternative families be added to the City's 1987 budget.
143. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration, 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213
Cal. Rptr. 410 (Ct. Ap. 1985), review denied August 15, 1985.
144. Id. at 526, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The Court determined that the denial of
benefits was not due to a classification based on sexual orientation, but rather was based
on a marital status classification.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 526-527, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
147. Id. at 527, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
148. Id. This type of judicial refusal to expand the common law is an example of the
importance of obtaining alternative family rights and an example demonstrating that
broad-based success will not result from bringing individual lawsuits which try to persuade
courts to extend benefits to alternative families. See also, fns. 179 to 181, infra, and
accompanying text.
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merited equal treatment with traditional families.149 Finally, the court as-
serted that alternative family members' right to privacy would be invaded
by having an administrative agency delve into their personal relationships
to obtain the information necessary to indicate parity with traditional
families.1"
The Hinman case illustrates a concern held by alternative family ad-
vocates. The court used the historical denial of benefits to alternative fmi-
lies and the historical state interest in promoting marriage as the basis for
refusing to judicially extend benefits to alternative families. Although
some courts are courageous enough to expand the common law when
changing circumstances require such an extension for equitable reasons,...
most courts will refuse, as the Hinman court refused, to extend benefits
without prior judicial precedent or legislative mandate. Because of this
type of refusal, alternative family members seeking an extension of bene-
fits may be better served by seeking the extension through state or local
legislation or collective bargaining agreements.
Two other cases are pending in California courts awaiting further
disposition. One is Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transportation. 1 52 In that
case, Brinkin challenged Southern Pacific Railroad's, his employer, denial
of funeral leave for him at the death of his same-sex partner of eleven
years. The funeral leave benefit was available to all married employees on
the death of his or her spouse.1" 3 Brinkin argued that the denial of funeral
leave benefits violated the California Constitution's privacy provision; the
Fair Employment and Housing Act, which prohibits marital status dis-
crimination; and the San Francisco Police Code which prohibits sexual
orientation discrimination.1 54
The other case is Chamberlin v. Frontier Airlines, Inc. 155 In that
case, Allen Chamberlin requested that reduced air fare benefits, available
149. Id. at 528, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
150. Id. This type of information would include the length of the relationship; the
eventual plans, if any, to marry; and the sincerity of the partners' commitment to one
another. Id. The argument that requiring such information would violate the right to pri-
vacy is specious, at best, because alternative family members requesting benefits would be
willing to provide such information or they would not apply for the benefits. Although
providing this information requires more disclosure of personal information from alterna-
tive families than is required from traditional families, unless a registration system exists
which confers alternative family status to specified relationships, no alternative presently
exists than disclosure of such information.
151. See, fns. 179 to 181, infra, and accompanying text.
152. 572 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The union, which opposed Brinkin's law-
suit, wanted the suit tried in federal court but the federal district court held that no federal
jurisdiction existed and remanded the case to the Superior Court of San Francisco. (No.
796271 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco City, filed June 29, 1972). See, Achtenberg, supra
fn. 124, at § 5.04[1][a1.
153. Id.
154. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117 at 43.
155. No. 310989 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento County filed Dec. 22, 1983.) See,
Achtenberg, supra note 124, at § 5.04[1i][a].
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to his co-workers' spouses and dependents, also be made available to his
same-sex partner of ten years.1 The airline denied his request and he
filed suit. After Chamberlin filed a complaint with the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing, his employer retaliated against him in
numerous ways, including a five-week suspension. 57  In his suit,
Chamberlin alleged that Frontier's actions violated his right to privacy
under the California Constitution, violated the prohibition against marital
status discrimination in the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act, and violated the prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination
in the San Francisco Police Code.1" 8 Frontier has been successful in hav-
ing some of Chamberlin's claims dismissed and the parties are currently
negotiating settlement on the remaining claims. 59 Frontier has since
changed its policy on travel benefits to include some unmarried
partners. 60
These cases show a willingness on the part of alternative family
members to bring suits challenging their employers' restriction of employ-
ment-related benefits to traditional families. Because two of the cases are
still pending, there is no clear expression of how the courts will decide
these lawsuits and whether the plaintiffs will be successful in obtaining
for alternative families the benefits that traditional families regularly re-
ceive. '6 As noted before, the Hinman court's refusal to extend benefits to
alternative family members indicates that state or local legislation or col-
lective bargaining agreements may be the most successful way to obtain
extension of benefits to alternative families.
D. Local Legislation Granting Employment Benefits
The cities of Berkeley and West Hollywood, California have ex-
tended employment-related benefits to city employees' domestic partners.
In Berkeley, domestic partners of city employees are entitled to the same
benefits that traditional family members receive. 62 An attempt to obtain
156. Id.
157. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at 44-45.
158. Achtenberg, supra fn. 124, at § 5.04[i][a].
159. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at 45.
160. Id.
161. See, also, fns. 201 to 205, infra, and accompanying text on suits brought to
compel workers' compensation death benefits and fns. 194 to 200, infra, and accompany-
ing text on suits to gain the right to sue for loss of consortium.
162. See, supra, fn. 8 which clarifies that these other ordinances apply to "domestic
partners," defined as lesbian and gay couples, and not to other alternative families, such as
unmarried heterosexual couples. The efforts of one man, Tom Brougham, were behind the
5 and year fight to get "domestic partner" benefits. Brougham tried to sign his partner
up for health benefits in August, 1979 but the city rejected his application. Brougham and
the East Bay Lesbian/Gay Democratic Club held public forums, developed proposals and
lobbied extensively for extension of benefits. In July, 1984, the City Council endorsed the
concept of domestic partner benefits but voted not to implement the plan until 1986. In
December, 1984, a new council voted to adopt a domestic partnership policy with immedi-
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legislative implementation of domestic partners' benefits was unsuccessful
in San Francisco. 6 Despite a negative reaction by the religious commu-
nity and the city's health insurance carriers, the Board of Supervisors
twice passed the legislation, only to have it vetoed both times by Mayor
Dianne Feinstein.16 4
The fight to obtain legislative extension of alternative family benefits
is currently underway in Madison, Wisconsin. The Madison ordinance
would extend benefits to any two adults and their dependents who are in
a mutually supportive committed relationship and who register with the
City Clerk as an alternative family.16 5 The main difference between the
Madison ordinance and most of the other enacted or proposed ordinances
is that the other ordinances only extend benefits to the alternative family
members of city employees. The Madison ordinance, on the other hand,
would require all employers within the City of Madison to extend em-
ployment-related benefits, including family health insurance benefits, to
all their employees who had registered as an alternative family with the
City Clerk. 6 The E.O.C. considered eliminating this requirement be-
cause of the substantial impact it might have on small employers or those
with a substantial number of alternative family members. At the urging of
alternative family rights advocates, however, the E.O.C. agreed to send
the ordinance, including employer health insurance coverage, to the
Madison Common Council for action.
Other cities currently considering an ordinance to extend benefits to
alternative families include Santa Cruz and Oakland, California, Minne-
apolis, Minnesota, and East Lansing, Michigan. 67 If all these cities ex-
tend benefits to alternative families, a strong grassroots movement will
ate implementation and now, the first domestic partners are registered and receiving bene-
fits. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at 39-41, A-l-A-3.
163. In 1982, a "domestic partnership" ordinance was introduced to the San Fran-
cisco Board of Supervisors by Supervisor Harry Britt. The ordinance would have allowed
domestic partners to register for certain benefits, including hospital and jail visitation. The
response from various segments of the community opposing the extension of benefits was
swift and vehement. Id. at 45-46.
164. Id.
165. The Madison Institute for Social Legisltion (M.I.S.L.) brought its request for
an alternative families' ordinance to the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission. The
E.O.C. established a task force on alternative family rights in 1984 and the task force
studied the desirability and feasibility of passing an alterntive family rights ordinance for
over two years. After the task force recommended adoption of the ordinance, the E.O.C.
continued to study the proposed ordinance for an additional year. The E.O.C. recently
approved the ordinance and sent it to the City Attorney's office for drafting where it re-
mains at this time. See, supra fn. 1.
166. The Madison ordinance would also amend the zoning ordinance's definition of
family to include alternative families (see, supra fns. 103 to 106 and accompanying text);
would require hospitals to give alternative families the right to visitation and medical au-
thorization (see, infra, fns. 202 to 204 and accompanying text); and would require public
accommodations offering family memberships to offer such memberships to alternative
families (see, infra, fn.s 225 to 231 and accompanying text).
167. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at 49.
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have begun to obtain protections and benefits for alternative family
members.
E. Collective Bargaining Efforts
Attempts are also being made to extend benefits to alternative fami-
lies through the collective bargaining process. Because this is the route by
which traditional families first gained their employment-related benefits,
it is conceivable that it will be the most successful way for alternative
families to obtain similar benefits. 68 The collective bargaining process led
to many of the benefit programs which are currently in existence."6 9 Col-
lective bargaining attempts to extend benefits are currently underway
within the University of California system and within numerous unions in
Madison, Wisconsin.17
168. However, the collective bargaining process will not result in benefits for all al-
ternative families because many employees are not unionized or will be unable to convince
their union or their employer to extend these benefits through the collective bargaining
process. Extension of benefits by some employers through the collective bargaining process,
however, will make the concept of benefits for alternative families better understood and
will probably lead to the continued extension of benefits on wider basis.
In situations where an employer does offer alternative family benefits to its employees
who are unionized, it will most likely be a mandatory issue for bargaining. Conversation
with Attorney Carol Rubin, Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, January 5,
1987. Thus, theoretically, the union could resist the employer's attempt to provide this
type of coverage because of fear the acceptance of alternative family coverage may result in
some reduction in wages or wage increases or a reduction in other benefits. Although this
type of resistance is theoretically possible, it is unlikely that a union would refuse a benefit
offered by an employer when that benefit would help some of its members and their
families.
169. See, supra fns. 139 to 141 and accompanying text. Additionally, the Vancouver,
Canada, Municipal Regional Employees Union has successfully negotiated benefits for gay
and lesbian clerical and support staff employed by the Vancouver School Board. The pro-
vision gives same-sex couples the medical and dental benefits that hae been available to
heterosexual couples. Equal Times News, p. 2 (Oct. 15, 1986).
170. Friend and Liberty, supra fn. 117, at 48-50. According to Neal Gleason, presi-
dent of AFSCME Local #144, the Wisconsin State Employees Union bargained with the
State of Wisconsin for the inclusion of "spouse equivalent" into the definition of "family"
for bereavement and sick leave purposes for its 1985-1987 contracts. "Spouse equivalent"
was specifically left gender neutral so that it would apply to heterosexual, gay and lesbian
couples. This expanded coverage was provided to all 24,000 unionized state employees.
Gleason indicated that the State was "openminded" toward this addition and did not raise
any objection to the expanded family definition. (Telephone conversation with Neal
Gleason in December 1986.)
M.I.S.L. is working with numerous Madison labor unions in an attempt to obtain
benefits through collective bargaining. In a survey of union members, M.I.S.L. determined
that 43% of survey respondents favored the extension of benefits to alternative families.
See, Task Force Report, supra fn. 1 at section R, pg. 1-3. Of these, 100% of alternative
family members, 34% of married respondents, and 53% of single respondents were sup-
portive. Id., at 8.
Examination of BNA's "What's New in Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Con-
tracts" for the years 1984-1986 did not include any reports of unions negotiating the issue
of extending employment benefits to alternative families in any area, including health in-
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F. Summary and Conclusion
Some alternative families are currently receiving employment-related
benefits equal to the benefits their co-workers receive for their traditional
families. This equity in compensation has resulted from the extensive ef-
forts of advocates using litigation, legislation and collective bargaining fo-
rums. As these efforts begin to result in benefits for alternative families, it
is hoped that the equity behind such an extension will be accepted and
embraced by additional employers and employees. Traditional family
members have received extensive benefits for numerous years while their
counterparts in alternative families have been denied access to the same
benefits. The time has come to end this injustice and provide equal bene-
fits to all families, regardless of their makeup.
IV. Obtaining Miscellaneous Traditional Family Benefits for
Alternative Families
A. Loss of Consortium
Another benefit alternative family members are seeking is the right to
bring a lawsuit for loss of consortium. Currently, loss of consortium
means "loss of society, affection, assistance and conjugal fellowship, and
includes loss or impairment of sexual relations. ' 17 1 Husbands have had
the right to sue for loss of consortium for at least three hundred years.1 72
The cause of action arose during a time that a wife was viewed as her
husband's servant and thus the husband had a proprietary interest in her
services x.17  The husband was entitled to a cause of action against a
tortfeasor who injured his wife because the tortfeasor damaged the hus-
band's property rights in his wife's services and society.174
The modern definition of consortium has shifted its emphasis from
loss of services to loss of relational interests, including the "elements of
love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, sexual relations, the
moral support each spouse gives the other through the triumph and de-
spair of life, and the deprivation of a spouse's physical assistance in oper-
ating and maintaining the family home."'17 5 The shift in emphasis from
surance, bereavement leave or sick leave.
171. Black's Law Dictionary 280 (5th ed. 1979).
172. Loss of Consortium, supra fn. 7 at 514. For additional discussion of consortium
benefits for cohabitants see, Note, Iowa Unmarried Cohabitants Denied Recovery for Loss
of Consortium, 69 Iowa L. Rev 11 (March 1984); Note, An Unmarried Cohabitant Can
Sue for Loss of Consortium if the Relationship is Both Stable and Significant, 6 Whittier
L. Rev 115 (1984); and Meade, Consortium Rights of the Unmarried: Time for a Reap-
praisal, 15 Fain. L.Q. 223 (Fall 1981) [hereinafter cited as Meade].
173. Loss of Consortium, supra fn. 7 at 514.
174. Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 60, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1983).
175. Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 633, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 917 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 1985). Consortium includes psychological injuries to the non-plaintiff spouse
also. Id.
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services to relational interests came with the end of viewing women as
.chattel and the movement toward equal rights between men and
women.' 6 Along with this shift in society's view of women came the ex-
tension to wives of the right to sue for loss of consortium."" In the first
case extending this cause of action to wives, the court stated:
[W]e are not unaware of the unanimity of authority elsewhere denying.
. recovery under these circumstances .... But after a careful examina-
tion of these cases we remain unconvinced that the rule which they have
laid down should be followed .... On the contrary, after piercing the
thin veils of reasoning employed to sustain the rule, we have been unable
to disclose any substantial rationale on which we would be willing to
predicate a denial of [an] action for loss of consortium [to a wife].1"'
Although now recognizing the right of both husbands and wives to sue for
loss of consortium, most courts refuse to extend the right beyond husbands
and wives because they define the suit as a right coming exclusively from
the marital relationship."7 9 Before Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange
County, only two cases had extended the right to sue for loss of consor-
tium to unmarried couples.180 But for the Butcher court, lack of precedent
was not an acceptable reason for refusing to expand the right to sue for
loss of consortium.
In that case, Butcher struck and injured Paul Forte who was crossing
a street.""' Paul was seriously injured and Cindy Forte sued as Paul's
wife for loss of consortium. 82 Paul and Cindy had been living together as
husband and wife for 11 and years at the time of the accident, and
Cindy took Paul's surname when their relationship began although they
were not legally married. 8 3 They had two children, filed joint income tax
returns and maintained joint bank accounts.' 4 Once Butcher learned that
Cindy and Paul were not married, however, he moved for summary judg-
176. Comment, Consortium Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, 9 A.J. Trial Ad. 147,
148 (1985) [hereinafter Consortium Rights].
177. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
178. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 812-813 (D.C. Cir. 1950) cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Smither and Company, Inc. v. Coles,
212 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
179. See, Consortium Rights, supra fn. 176, at 149-50 and the cases cited therein.
180. See, Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) [unmarried male allowed to sue for loss of consortium when fiancee was injured
one month before their marriage, although damages only allowed from date of marriage]
and Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) [divorced woman allowed
to sue for loss of consortium when ex-husband injured before marriage but after decision
to remarry.] Bulloch has been criticized for ignoring previous New Jersey precedent and
for being an inaccurate attempt to predict the direction New Jersey law would take. Loss
of Consortium, supra fn. 7, at 518. But see, Meade, supra fn. 172, at p. 225 n. 16.
181. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 59, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
182. Id. at 60, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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ment on Cindy's suit for loss of consortium.' The trial court denied the
motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision."' 6
The Butcher court noted that a suit for consortium had shifted from
one for lost services to one for interference with the continuing relational
interest.187 After addressing the policy reasons raised for limiting the suit
to married couples, the court refused to abdicate its responsibility for the
upkeep of the common law by leaving any extension of the right to the
legislature.' The court cited Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. for the
proposition that:
The inherent capacity of the common law for growth and change is its
most significant feature. Its development has been determined by the so-
cial needs of the community which it serves . . . . 'The nature of the
common law requires that each time a rule of law is applied, it be care-
fully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and needs of the times
have not so changed as to make further application of it the instrument
of injustice. Whenever an old rule is found unsuited to present conditions
or unsound, it should be set aside and a rule declared which is in har-
mony with those conditions and meets the demands of justice.'189
The Butcher court concluded that other California precedent denying
extension of the right for loss of consortium to children and other unmar-
ried couples did not preclude it from extending the right in this case.' 90 It
noted that "the relationship of unmarried cohabitants bears every resem-
blance to the spousal relationship, including the sexual aspect absent from
other relationships, except that the relationship has not been solemnized
by a formal marriage ceremony."' 9'
A critical question which arises from extending the right to sue for
loss of consortium to unmarried couples was whether a defendant could
foresee that another adult may also be interested in the victim's injuries.'92
The court determined that, in contemporary society, a defendant could
foresee that if he or she injured an adult, that adult was likely to be co-
habiting with another adult who would have a relational interest in the
victim's wellbeing.' 3 The relationship of unmarried cohabitants possesses
185. Id.
186. Id. at 62, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 394, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669 (1974). [citations
omitted].
190. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 65, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 67, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
193. Id. at 67-68, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 510. The court noted that the incidence of cohab-
itation without marriage increased 800 percent between 1960 and 1970 and that the possi-
bility that an adult was cohabiting with another adult was foreseeable and neither unex-
pected nor remote. Id. at 68, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 511. See, also, Ledger, 164 Cal. App. 3d at
631, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 816 where the court noted that the number of unmarried couples
tripled between 1970 and 1980, increasing from 523,000 to 1,560,000.
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every characteristic of marriage except formal certification and if a proper
test for evaluating cohabitation relationships could be determined, no rea-
son existed for denying a cause of action to the injured victim's partner.'"
In order for an unmarried cohabitant to successfully sue for loss of
consortium, the plaintiff would have to show that the relationship is both
stable and significant and thus parallel to the marital relationship."9 5 The
plaintiff could establish that a stable, significant relationship existed by
presenting evidence of the length of the relationship, the degree of eco-
nomic entanglement and cooperation, the exclusive nature of the sexual
relationship, whether the parties had entered into any joint contracts, and
whether there was a family relationship with children."9" The court held
that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and it remanded the case for consideration on the merits.
The Butcher court expanded the right to sue for loss of consortium to
unmarried cohabitants in a well-reasoned, well-documented decision. It
met its responsibility to change and expand the common law when it de-
termined that the common law restriction on the consortium right no
longer addressed the changing needs and realities of society in a just or
equitable fashion. However, its expansion of the right to unmarried
couples has not been followed, even in California.19 7
In rejecting the Butcher analysis, the Ledger court held that a suit
for loss of consortium could not be brought by an unmarried cohabi-
tant.'1 One of the Ledger court's reasons for rejecting Butcher was its
concern for reaffirming a strong public policy favoring marriage which
did not have a counterpart for favoring nonmarital relationships.199 While
recognizing that the plaintiff had lost a loved one, the court refused to
extend the consortium right to unmarried couples primarily due to a fear
194. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
195. Id. at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
196. Id.
197. See Ledger, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 636, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 819 and the cases cited
in Consortium Rights, supra 176, at 150 fn. 37 & 38, 153 n. 60.
198. Jennifer Ledger and Richard Arters II had been cohabiting for over two years
before Arters died in an automobile accident caused by Tippitt. Ledger and Arters had
planned on marrying twice but were prevented from doing so both times due to external
circumstances. They had a child and lived together as a family. Ledger, 164 Cal. App. at
630-631, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 816. The court also held that an unmarried cohabitant could
not bring a wrongful death action after the death of one's partner because the right was
purely statutory and only extended to the heirs named in the statute, including spouses. Id.
at 633, 210 Cal. Rptr, at 817. But the court did extend the right to sue for negligent
infliction of emotional distress from only marital or intimate familial relationships to un-
married couples. Id. at 643-648, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 824-828.
199. Id. at 636, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The court's other reasons for refusing to
extend a cause of action for loss of consortium to unmarried couples included being
troubled by a party marrying into a cause of action, and being concerned that unmarried
couples' privacy rights would be invaded while determining whether the relationship was
stable and significant. Id. at 636-637, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 819-820.
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of inconsistent results by juries attempting to determine which relation-
ships were stable and significant.200
In his dissent, Judge Gilbert argued that it was not too difficult for a
jury to determine what a stable and significant relationship was and that
to deny recovery under the facts of that particular case was to apply the
law without regard to present day reality.20 1 Judge Gilbert acknowledged
the similarity between alterntive families and traditional families while
stating that:
[Flamily may 'mean different things under different circumstances. The
family, for instance, may be ... a particular group of people related by
blood or marriage, or not related at all, who are living together in the
intimate and mutual interdependence of a single home or household
.... ' This court has recognized that 'the family is the basic unit of our
society, the center of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich
human life' . . . . [citations omitted].202
He also reasoned that, while some people might marry for cynical rea-
sons, he did not believe that the opportunity to bring a suit for loss of
consortium was one of them. 0 3 To deny recovery to all unmarried plain-
tiffs due to the absence of a marriage certificate would result in a windfall
for tortfeasors who may luckily injure the partner of an unmarried person
rather than the partner of a married person.20 4
In the same way that the courts extended the right to sue for loss of
consortium to women as society began to acknowledge equal rights be-
tween men and women, so too must the courts extend the right to sue for
loss of consortium to unmarried couples. Although precedent does now
exist, after Butcher, for this expansion, it will take determined plaintiffs,
continuing to press for this right, in order to convince courts to consist-
ently grant this right to unmarried couples. And in the same way that the
right has begun to expand, it must continue to expand to include all indi-
viduals who have a substantial relational interest in an injured partner, at
least when that interest includes the type of relationships that exist be-
tween married couples. Thus, unmarried heterosexual couples and gay
and lesbian couples, who can establish a stable and significant relation-
ship, should be granted the right to sue for loss of consortium after an
injury to their partner.
B. Unemployment and Workers' Compensation Benefits
Unlike many other statutory entitlement programs, some statutes reg-
ulating unemployment and workers' compensation contain broad defini-
tions of family members who may be eligible for benefits. Because of the
200. Id. at 639, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
201. Id. at 650, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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breadth of these definitions, alternative family members have, on some
occasions, been able to assert and win the right to receive such benefits.
In an unemployment case, MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Ap-
peals Board,210 an unmarried claimant who quit her job to accompany
her family partner and their child to New York was granted unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. The California Supreme Court determined
that she had established "good cause" for leaving her job because she
moved to New York in order to preserve her alternative family. 0 6 The
Court indicated that its earlier decisions had left open the possibility that
an unmarried claimant might be able to establish good cause after follow-
ing a nonmarital partner to another state in order to maintain their famil-
ial relationship. 0 7 Good cause existed for personal reasons unconnected to
the employment situation only if those reasons were imperative and com-
pelling.2 °s The Court found it "difficult to conceive of a more fundamen-
tal familial relationship than one which is created when two parents es-
tablish a home with their natural child."2 9 The state's policy in favor of
maintaining secure, stable relationships between parents and children was
as strong as its interest in preserving marriage and therefore, Mac-
Gregor's unmarried status did not preclude her from receiving benefits
because moving to New York was necessary in order to maintain the fam-
ily relationship with her partner and their child. 10
In a worker's compensation case, the California Court of Appeals
concluded that Earl Donovan was eligible for workers' compensation
death benefits after his partner committed suicide due to job-related
stress.211 Donovan's partner, Thomas Finnerty, had been found 100 per-
205. 37 Cal. 3d 205, 207 Cal. Rptr. 823, 689 P.2d 453 (1984).
206. Id. at 212-13, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 828, 689 P.2d at 458. But see, Norman v.
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, 663 P.2d 904
(1983). In Norman, the California Supreme Court determined that Norman had not es-
tablished "good cause" to leave her job because of her need to move with her "loved one"
to Washington. Although the Court determined that nothing in her unmarried state pre-
cluded her from obtaining benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled to, the Court
held that:
[i]n the absence of legislation which grants to members of a nonmarital relation-
ship the same benefits as those granted to spouses, no basis exists in this context
for extending to non-marital relations the preferred status afforded to marital
relations.
Id. at 9, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 663 P.2d at 909.
207. MacGregor at 207, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 824, 689 P.2d at 454. The Court ex-
amined its decision in Norman, and concluded that Norman had foreseen claims like Mac-
Gregor's and had suggested that some significant factor, in addition to a nonmarital rela-
tionship, might provide compelling circumstances thus enabling the claimant to receive
benefits. Id. at 210-11, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27, 689 P.2d at 456-457.
208. Id. at 209, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 826, 689 P.2d at 456.
209. Id. at 212, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 828, 689 P.2d at 458.
210. Id. at 213-14, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 829, 689 P.2d at 459.
211. Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 138 Cal. App. 3d 323, 187
Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. App. Dist. 1982).
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cent disabled due to an injury he sustained to his nervous syster while
working as a Deputy District Attorney.212 Thereafter, Finnerty commit-
ted suicide and Donovan filed for workers' compensation death benefits
based on his status as Finnerty's dependent. The controlling statute ex-
tended benefits to the employee and his or her dependents; according to
the statutory definition, dependent status existed only if a person was a
good faith member of the employee's family or household. 21' The Court of
Appeals held that "[m]erely because two persons of the same sex occupy a
single residential structure does not dictate either the sexual influences or
dependency within the meaning of the code."'2 14 The Court remanded the
case to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to determine whether
Donovan was Finnerty's dependent and thus eligible to receive death
benefits.21 5
These cases establish that alternative family status does not necessa-
rily preclude an individual from receiving unemployment o7 workers'
compensation benefits. If individuals are otherwise eligible and can meet
the broad statutory test for eligibility, they will not always be denied ben-
efits simply because they are not part of a traditional family relationship.
C. Hospital Visitation and Treatment Authorization
Another benefit routinely granted to traditional families, and denied
to alternative families, is the opportunity to visit a family member in the
hospital or to authorize emergency medical treatment when a family
member is physically or mentally incapable of doing so. Hospitals fre-
quently restrict visitation or emergency treatment authorization to mem-
bers of the patient's immediate family. Immediate family is usually de-
fined as husband, wife, children (although some age restrictions may
apply), and others related by blood, marriage or adoption.
The impact of this restriction on visitation and treatment authoriza-
tion is accentuated when a family member is already physically or men-
tally ill and the family itself is in a state of intense despair and distress.21 1
212. Id. at 325, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
213. Id. at 328, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873. The Court of Appeals previously held that a
nonmarital partner was a good faith member and dependent of the deceased employee's
household and her unmarried relationship did not bar her from receiving death benefits.
Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 94 Cal.
App. 3d 72, 78, 156 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186 (Cal. App. Dist. 1979).
214. Donovan, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873. The Court's holding
indicated that Donovan's alleged homosexual relationship with Finnerty did not, by itself,
preclude Donovan from obtaining workers' compensation death benefits.
215. Id. Evidence presented to the Board had been conflicting about whether Fin-
nerty was a gay man and thus, whether Donovan had a homosexual relationship with
Finnerty and was Finnerty's dependent. Id.
216. "For each of us, the time will likely come or perhaps it already has when a
loved one is ill or injured and brought to a hospital, and we, the loved ones, feel some of
the pain and helplessness of our friend or relative .... What hospitals can offer and, in
my opinion, as proponents of human dignity what they owe to those whom they serve is to
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To then be restricted from visitation or treatment authorization simply
adds to the distressing nature of the situation and tends to cause signifi-
cant problems for both the patient and the patient's family members.
Examples of how this restriction works against alternative family
members are found both in court cases as well as in testimony supporting
passage of alternative family legislation. In Whitman v. Mercy-Memorial
Hospital,217 Karen Whitman and Edward Coch challenged Mercy-Me-
morial Hospital's policy restricting attendance in its delivery rooms by
nonmedical persons to only "a husband or member of the immediate fam-
ily of the mother giving birth." Because Whitman and Coch were not
married, the hospital refused to allow Coch into the delivery room even
though Coch was the father of Whitman's child.2" 8 Coch and Whitman
had attended a natural childbirth course together and had received the
physician's permission for Coch's presence in the delivery room. But the
hospital's policy precluded his attendance at his child's birth.
In ruling that the hospital's policy discriminated on the basis of mari-
tal status in violation of the state's Civil Rights Act,2"9 the court deter-
mined that the hospital was governed by the law because it was a public
accommodation.22 The court noted that if Whitman and Coch had been
married to one another, Coch would have been permitted into the delivery
room and therefore, the hospital's policy discriminated against him due to
his marital status. 221 Although the court agreed with the hospital that its
policy regulating who could be present in its delivery room was purely
discretionary and not constitutionally-based, the court held that the hospi-
tal, after establishing the policy, had to administer it in a nondiscrimina-
tory manner.222
In a similar situation, the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission
received testimony from a stepparent who was prohibited from visiting her
stepson who was seriously ill in a Madison hospital. The woman and her
husband were married in 1967 and formed a family with their eight chil-
keep loved ones close together in times of crisis. The stress of abandonment and loneliness
compound the already-placed stress of uncertainty, pain, and ultimate mortality .... It's a
time when loved ones, not as defined by law but as defined by love, should be together...
. In terms of hospital visitation, I see no choice but to allow loved ones, whatever be the
nature of their relatedness, to be united. If not, we are trying to cure some ills, but we are
creating others . . . ." Testimony of Emergency Physician Mark Katz, Sept. 20, 1984,
Task Force Report, supra fn. 1, at section J, pages 1-2.
217. 339 N.W.2d 730 (Mich. 1983).
218. In an appeal from the trial court's denial of Coch's request for an injunction
against the Hospital, the Michigan Court of Appeals agreed to decide the case even though
the baby had been born before the appeal was heard and Coch had eventually been al-
lowed into the delivery room. While the case was technically moot, the Court determined
that the issue was of public significance and likely to recur in the future and thus, decided
to hear the appeal. Id. at 731.
219. M.C.L. § 37.2302(a); M.S.A. § 3.548(302)(2).
220. Whitman,' 339 N.W.2d at 732.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 733.
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dren from previous marriages. The children were raised together as one
family. Eight years later, the youngest child required emergency treatment
at a hospital and was in critical condition. The hospital, responding to the
natural mother's wishes, restricted visitation to the child's immediate fam-
ily. The stepmother was not allowed to visit her stepson even though he
was close to death. She had to rely on her husband and the child's other
immediate family members to give her information about her stepson's
condition. The child eventually recovered but the stepmother still lives in
fear that she could again be excluded from hospital visitation.223
Another example indicating the serious impact of restricting treat-
ment authorization and control to a patient's biologically-related family
comes from the experience of Karen Thompson and Sharon Kowalski.22'
Thompson and Kowalski are a lesbian couple who had lived together for
5 years, owned a house together and had exchanged rings symbolizing
their commitment to one another. 25 Kowalski was seriously injured in an
accident which left her a quadraplegic. Thompson spent numerous days
in the hospital with Kowalski helping her begin her recovery and at a
physician's urging, informed Kowalski's parents of their lesbian relation-
ship. Outraged by this information, the parents asserted their authority as
immediate family and were named Kowalski's guardians. Although the
judge granted Thompson equal access to Kowalski, the parents moved her
more than 150 miles away from Thompson, thereby making visitation vir-
tually impossible.226 The legal battle over access is continuing and cur-
rently Thompson is denied access. Kowalski, denied Thompson's help and
attention, is retreating further into a coma.227
The Madison E.O.C. also received testimony from two lesbians
about problems they had encountered while one of them was hospitalized
in a life-threatening situation. Before the surgery, the women talked to
doctors and hospital personnel in an attempt to ensure visitation by the
alternative family member and permission for her to authorize emergency
treatment. However, at the time of the surgery, because the patient's
mother was also present, the alternative family member was harassed by
hospital staff and was informed that, according to the staff, she was not
family and would not be treated as such. Because she had previously ob-
tained power of attorney authority, she was able to continue her visitation
and treatment authorization but, without such documentation she would
have been excluded.22s
223. Testimony of Trudy Dyreson, Dec. 13, 1983, Task Force Report, supra fn. 1,
at section 1, pages 1-2.
224. Rivera, supra fn. 8, at 389.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Equal Times, May 14, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
228. Testimony of Kathy Patrick, Sept. 20, 1984, Task Force Report, supra fn. 1, at
section J, pages 30-33. Since then, Patrick's life partner, Susan Green, died following an
extensive illness.
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Alternative family advocates have managed to circumvent hospital re-
strictions in some situations by encouraging family members to plan
ahead, as noted above, and develop legal documents authorizing an alter-
native family member to make healthcare decisions. These documents are
either durable powers of attorney229 or hospital-visitation authoriza-
tions.25 0 These legal documents will probably be persuasive to physicians
and hospital personnel and will provide important evidence of the princi-
pal's intent if court proceedings become necessary.231
Under local legislation, a problem of state preemption may arise in
attempting to require hospitals to recognize alternative family members to
the same extent that they currently recognize immediate family members
for visitation and treatment authorization purposes.232 In a memo received
April 16,1986 by the Madison E.O.C., Assistant City Attorney Eunice
Gibson informally indicated that a court would probably find that the
area of authorization of health care was an area of exclusive statewide
concern and thus would preempt any local attempt at regulation.2 3 As a
result of that informal legal advice, the E.O.C. participated in the admin-
istrative rule-making process of the State Department of Health and So-
cial Services in an attempt to provide statewide benefits to alternative fam-
ily members. The E.O.C. encouraged the Department to amend ch. HSS
124.05(3)(b), Wis. Admin. Code, to include language ensuring hospital
visitation by persons designated by the patient and to recognize medical
powers of attorney for making decisions on treatment, review of patient
files and visitation if the patient were unable to do so.2 34 The Department
has not issue its revised rules and therefore, it is currently unknown
whether this attempt at statewide regulation was successful.
Alternative families wanting to prevent problems with hospital visita-
229. The durable power of attorney allows the power of attorney to remain in effect
despite the later incapacity of the principal. Rivera, supra fn. 8, at 390 n. 764. Most
durable power of attorney laws are ambiguous about whether the delegation of power
allows the principal to delegate authority to authorize personal acts if the principal be-
comes mentally incapacitated. Achtenberg, supra fn. 124, at § 4.07(2). Health Care Dura-
ble Powers of Attorney have been legislatively created in some states to deal with this
ambiguity. Id. These forms would allow alternative family members to designate their
family members to act in their behalf in making health care decisions and would ensure
that their decisions were respected. Id. In states not having specific health care durable
powers of attorney, alternative family members can execute a separate document authoriz-
ing an alternative family member to make only medical decisions. Id. at § 4.07(3).
230. This form was invented by Attorney Matt Coles of San Francisco. The impetus
for the invention came after a friend of Coles was denied visitation to her alternative
family member who eventually died. National Law Journal, Monday, August 2, 1982 at
8.
231. Achtenberg, supra fn. 124, at § 4.07(3).
232. See, supra, fn. 5.
233. April 16, 1986 memo, p. 5.
234. According to Barbara Lightner of M.I.S.L. although Wisconsin has a durable
power of attorney statute, it is unclear whether it includes the authority to authorize emer-
gency medical treatment. See, supra fn. 219 and accompanying text.]
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tion or emergency medical authorization should obtain the necessary legal
documents giving an alternative family member preference over traditional
family members in making these decisions. Only in this way can they try
to ensure that their families will be respected and acknowledged in these
situations.
D. Membership Benefits
Another benefit which traditional family members receive, and which
is usually unavailable to alternative family members, is the opportunity to
join museums, art centers, health clubs or other organizations for a re-
duced family rate.2" 5 Although some people may argue that these are not
substantial benefits, they are significant for several reasons. In addition to
the reduced cost resulting from family rates as opposed to separate indi-
vidual rates, recognition by an organization that the alternative family is a
legitimate family has a positive effect on all family members.2"'
Two adult alternative family members have challenged the denial of
family rates for their alternative family by the Y.M.C.A. of Metropolitan
Madison. Olson and Popp v. Y.M.C.A. of Metropolitan Madison, Inc.23 7
In that case, the complainants were two lesbians living with their two
children as a family. They applied to the Y.M.C.A. for a family member-
ship, were denied such a membership and instead, were offered one indi-
vidual membership (for Olson) and one family membership (for Popp and
her biological children).238 The complainants asserted that the Y.M.C.A.'s
definition of family discriminated against them due to their marital status
and sexual orientation and cost them approximately $200 more per year
than if they had been eligible for a family membership.23 9 The Hearing
Examiner from the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission dismissed
their claim on the grounds that the Equal Opportunities Ordinance,
which prohibits marital status and sexual orientation discrimination, did
not prohibit alternative family discrimination and thus did not cover the
type of discrimination alleged by the complainants.24" On appeal, the
235. Some organizations are beginning, however, to recognize alternative families and
are structuring their rates to include them under reduced family rates. For example, the
Madison Art Center offers a reduced-rate "dual" membership available to any two indi-
viduals, regardless of relationship status. Task Force Report, supra fn. 1, at Section E,
December 20, 1984, pg. 3.
236. The long-term impact of the acceptance of alternative families by society could
reduce social stigmas that some children receive as members of an alternative family. It
will also result in recognition of the parenting relations and responsibilities that co-parents
have with their partners' children. Task Force Report, supra fn. 1, at Section E, March
15, 1984, pgs. 1-2.
237. Case No. 3110, Oct. 10, 1985.
238. Id. at 3. The Y.M.C.A.'s definition of family was that "[f]amily membership
shall include a principal member and all members of the immediate household who are
eligible to be claimed as dependents on the federal/state income tax return." Id. at 2.
239. Id. at 2-3.
240. Id. at 2. The complainants contended that they should have been given the op-
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Madison Equal Opportunities Commission upheld the Examiner's deci-
sion that the ordinance did not require organizations to extend eligibility
for family memberships to alternative families.24
V. Conclusion
The problems encountered by alternative families seeking traditional
family protections and benefits are far-reaching and omnipresent. Wher-
ever one turns in this society, protections and benefits are afforded to
traditional families and denied to alternative families. The refusal by
courts to extend common law or statutory rights to alternative families
and the refusal to interpret existing anti-discrimination statutes as prohib-
iting differentiation between traditional families and alternative families
are reasons why alternative family rights' legislation needs to be enacted.
Until such legislation exists, alternative families will continue to be denied
those protections and benefits which traditional families enjoy and have
come to expect. Only after encountering alternative family discrimination
does one fully realize the pervasive and far-reaching impact that this dis-
crimination has on a large portion of the population. All families deserve
equal legal protections and benefits and until all families receive them,
this pervasive discrimination will continue to injure countless family mem-
bers and erode their families.
portunity to prove that the Y.M.C.A.'s neutral family definition had a discriminatory ef-
fect on them because, as lesbian adults, they could not marry under state law and thus,
could not be claimed as dependents on federal or state income tax returns. Id. No other
cases, besides those noted in the employment section, exist which allege that discrimination
against an alternative family status is prohibited by existing statutes prohibiting sexual
orientation or marital status discrimination.
241. Id. at 3. This author, a member of the Madison Equal Opportunities Commis-
sion, dissented from that decision, arguing that the Y.M.C.A.'s decision to tie family mem-
berships to marital status had the effect of discriminating against the complainants due to
their sexual orientation because they were precluded from marriage under state law. Id. at
5. Although the ordinance did not explicitly provide protection to alternative families, it
did protect alternative family members from discrimination based on their marital status or
sexual orientation and thus, in this situation, should have been interpreted to prohibit this
type of discrimination. Id. at 5-6.
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